Persian gulf security: the United States and Oman, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and western allied participation. by Gawlik, Joseph Anthony
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1982
Persian gulf security: the United States and Oman,













PERSIAN GULF SECURITY: THE UNITED STATES
AND OMAN, THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL,




Thesis Advisor Ralph H. Magnus




SECURITY CLASSIFICATION* OF THIS PACK f**m* Dmtm Hni.r.«;
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
!' miro*r number 2. OOVT ACCESSION NO
4. T|T L C :««d Sueflfl.)
Persian Gulf Security; The United States and









J REORIENT - * CATALOG NUMBER
5 TYRE OF REPORT A PERlOO COVEREO
Master's Thesis
December 1982
» PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
I. CONTRACT OR GRANT NLMBERft;
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT PROJECT taskAREA i WORK UNIT NUMBERS
II. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME ANO AOORESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
VI MONITORING AGENCY NAME * ADDRESS^// dlllmtmnl Irom Cottlrotlint Olilet)
12. REPORT DATE
December 1982
II. NUMBER OF PAGES
124




l«. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ai tt)t» *f>«ri)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (el «*• abutrmct *r»r.<( In Block 30, II dlttprpnt horn Kupori)
I*. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES




20 ABSTRACT (Conltnup «w r«»»r»« .<«• li RP«PMa*w *»«" Im^ttltf *r *>!•«* «*«»»wr)
This thesis examines Persian Gulf security from a geostrategic and histori-
cal perspective. It emphasizes the current relationship between the United
States and Oman and offers the opinion that this is not the best policy course
for the U.S.
Secondly, the thesis proposes two alternative routes for Gulf security by
examining the newly formed Gulf Cooperation Council and Western Allied contri-
butions toward Gulf defense.
DD , °" 73 1473 EDITION O* ' "°v •• '» OMOLfTt Unclassified
S/N 10 3-0I4" 6601 SECURITY CLASflFlCATlON Of THIS PAOB (-»>•" Dmtm Xnt—d)

Unclassified
fatmnT. ei*ii'"C«*'»«i o> t««i> »•««?«—»— n»n «»t—
<
The thesis concludes with a look at the advantages and disadvantages of
the various Gulf security policies and proposes a new course for U.S. policy
in the region.
DD Form 1473 2 Unclassified
1 Jan 73 . . _ .

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Persian Gulf Security: The United States
and Oman, the Gulf Cooperation Council,
and Western Allied Participation
by
Joseph Anthony Gawlik
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., University of Dayton, 1970
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






This thesis examines Persian Gulf security from a geostrategic
and historical perspective. It emphasizes the current relationship
between the United States and Oman and offers the opinion that this
is not the best policy for the U.S.
Secondly, the thesis proposes two alternative routes for Gulf
security by examining the newly formed Gulf Cooperation Council and
Western Allied contributions toward Gulf defense.
The thesis concludes with a look at the advantages and disad-
vantages of the various Gulf security policies and proposes a new
course for U.S. policy in the region.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The current misguided U.S. Persian Gulf policy is hung on the
facade of strategic consensus, a thematic policy that is primarily
aimed at curtailing Soviet expansionism and ambitions in the
Middle East and the Gulf. According to some, strategic consensus
is both foolhardy and ephemeral and a policy that stems from
rhetoric and a global viewpoint. A Gulf policy based on stra-
tegic consensus tends to treat the area as an arena for superpower
competition and confrontation and ignores the regional actors and
their perceptions of Gulf security. Contrary to being a viable
solution to security problems in the Persian Gulf, reliance on a
strategic consensus based policy could exacerbate regional con-
flicts and stimulate upheaval in the area.
This thesis is written in two parts. First it examines the
Persian Gulf from a geostrategic and historical perspective em-
phasizing Oman, its history of internal and external challenges
to the Sultanate, and its history of external support provided
chiefly by the United Kingdom and the United States. It then
offers an opinion that the current Oman-U.S. relationship (which
plays the strategic consensus card) is not the best course for
the U.S. to take to ensure the security of the Gulf (and its oil).
Secondly, the thesis presents two alternative routes toward
Gulf security by examining the Gulf Cooperation Council, its col-
lective defense plans, foreign relations, and contemporary
3

problems; and several Western Alliance options for involvement in
Gulf affairs. An attempt is made throughout to emphasize not a
strategic consensus type policy but rather a regionally based policy
with little direct U.S. participation.
Finally, the thesis seeks to weigh the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the various programs for Gulf security and to offer an
opinion as to which would be the best for the region and the U.S.
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From time immemorial the Gulf region - under various names - has
been an area of utmost strategic importance whose value has increased
even more so with the discovery of oil. In 1951, President Eisenhower
described the Persian Gulf as the most strategically important area
in the world and some thirty-one years, two oil embargoes, a major
revolution, and an ongoing war later, there cannot be a more apt
description of this most volatile and turbulent area. The Iranian
revolution, the invasion of Afghanistan, the Mecca mosque incident,
the Iran-Iraq war, and the coup attempt in Bahrain have underscored
the vulnerability of the conservative Gulf regimes and thus of the
West to a range of potential external and regional threats. The
problem of the 1980' s, therefore, is to find the best way to ensure
the security of the conservative Gulf regimes and the flow of oil
to the West.
Prior to any attempt to analyze and to offer solutions to the
contemporary problems confronting the Gulf states, it is necessary
to become familiar with some geostrategic facts and history
associated with the Gulf. This chapter portends to accomplish just
that.
A. GEOGRAPHICAL FACTS
The Gulf is surrounded, at the north by Iraq, at the west by the
Arabian Peninsula, at the east by Iran, and at the south by the
Strait of Hormuz. Extending from the Gulf of Oman to the marshes of
11

the Shatt al-Arab it is 600 miles long with its widest point being
230 miles. With no discernible channel, the Gulf is shaped like a
flat, shallow basin never exceeding 300 feet in depth. The shores
of the Gulf are generally inhospitable, swampy in the north and
desert elsewhere, occasionally broken by salt flats. The climate
of the Gulf is harsh and generally arid. The summer (May-October)
temperature averages over 115 degrees Fahrenheit and David Long re-
ported, in his study of the Gulf, a 145 degree thermometer reading.
Contrary to the ideas of many Westerners, however, the climate is
not always hot and dry. Along the coast, the summer months are
\/ery muggy and the humidity sometimes stays at 100 percent for days.
Alternatively, in the winter months, temperatures drop very rapidly,
4
and it is not uncommon for them to dip below freezing.
B. NOMENCLATURE
One of the very first problems witnessed by the Gulf region was
that of its name. The Gulf began as the Lower Sea in the third
millenium B.C. and is now called either the Persian Gulf, Arabian
Gulf (sometimes the Islamic Gulf), or just the Gulf. In fact, the
Gulf has been called many other names by the Babylonians, the
5
Greeks, and the first inhabitants and navigators. For the last
two centuries or so the term "Persian Gulf" has been in universal
use and it was not until the 1960's that the Arabs adopted the ex-
pression al-Khalij al-Arabi. Throughout this thesis the terms
Persian Gulf, Arabian Gulf, and the Gulf will be used interchange-




The strategic importance of the Persian Gulf has come from its
usefulness as a passageway between Europe and Asia. It has remained
throughout the ages a heavily navigated trade route between Europe,
East Africa, and Southeast Asia. It has maintained this character
even after World War II and the development of aviation and air
transport. Of more contemporary importance, the Gulf is situated in
a sedimentary basin which holds roughly two-thirds of the world's
proven reserves of oil. The growing importance of Persian Gulf oil
is illustrated by its increasing percentage of total world oil out-
put. In 1976, the oil-producing states bordering the Persian Gulf
accounted for 37 percent of world output. This compares with 27
percent of world output derived from the Gulf in 1966, 24 percent
in 1961, 19 percent in 1956, and 15 percent in 1951. In a period of
expanding energy demand, the Persian Gulf producers would appear to
be in a strong position for some time into the immediate future.
It may be significant to note that Western Europe has far more
at stake in the Persian Gulf than the U.S. It relies on Gulf oil
for almost two-thirds of its total oil consumption. France clearly
has the most at stake: almost three-fourths of its oil comes from
Persian Gulf imports, a dramatic increase from 15 years ago when
half its oil came from the region. As a primary energy source,
imported Gulf oil has become increasingly important to France, up
from about one-fifth of all energy consumed in 1965 to over half of
it by 1978. France is almost as dependent on the Gulf for its
energy as is Japan, which relies on the Gulf for 80 percent of its
13

oil and 60 percent of its energy. Thus, it is ironic that the U.S.,
not Western Europe or Japan, now bears the mantle of protecting
Western security interests in the Gulf. (Increased Allied partici-





The history of the Arabian Gulf and its region is fraught
with problems, conflicts, and wars and it may be said that the prob-
lems it is facing today stem from events that took place towards the
end of the last century and the beginning of the twentieth century.
One will recall that the early years of this century witnessed a
revival of European competition over the Gulf. The Russians, the
French, and the Germans began to look at the Gulf in the same way as
the Portuguese and the Dutch had looked at it before (East-West
trade). Britain, which had in the meantime established interests in
the region, sought, on the other hand, to oppose the other European
states' ambitions and to protect its own interests and positions in
the region. The Russian-British conflict ended in 1907 with the
signing of an agreement which split Iran into two zones of influ-
ence, the north for Russia and the south for Britain. The British
also succeeded in preventing the Germans from establishing a port
in the Gulf and in barring the French from the region. By the end
of World War I, the Gulf was virtually made a British preserve by




The Second World War marked the end of exclusive British
presence in the Gulf for various reasons, including the aftermath
of the war, the weakening of Britain as an imperialist and colonial
power, and the rise of the U.S. which progressively replaced Britain
as the dominating Western power in the Gulf region, both politically
and economically. The British Labor Government's decision in 1968
to terminate a century and a half of hegemony by withdrawing all
British forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971 marked a
watershed in U.S. relations with the Gulf states. Since the British
withdrawal and the 1973 oil embargo, the U.S. has pursued a fairly
well-defined policy in the Persian Gulf. First there was President
Nixon's "region of peace" policy in 1973, and then there was the
"twin pillar policy" with Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco's
encouragement of regional cooperation efforts and reliance on the
two key countries of Saudi Arabia and Iran in 1975. Simply put,
until the Carter era and strategic consensus was ushered in, the U.S.
policy in the Persian Gulf post-British withdrawal consisted of de-
pendence on regional cooperation and a very limited U.S. presence in
the area. It is the contention of this thesis that the U.S. should
reevaluate current policies and lean more toward the regional
cooperation and other policies which have come before.
2. Local Actors
The preceding capsulized history was concerned with the
important extra-regional actors, now a look at the local actors is
apropos. One of the more important actors in the region, and the
one who dominates today's press, is Iran, especially since the fall
15

of the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979 and the attendant rise of Khomeini.
Iran's rulers will always try to extend Iran's military power over
the Gulf, which is one of the central tenets of Iranian security
policy. The British military withdrawal from the Gulf left Iran as
the strongest local power; a position the Shah tried to maintain
with U.S. help. The Arab states of the Gulf were comfortable when
Iran played the role of Gulf policeman; however, today the roles
have changed. Now the Arab states have to police the Gulf them-
selves and the Iranians have become a nemesis.
The Iran-Iraq war has precipitated several events, the most
significant being the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(which is discussed at length in Chapter IV). Occasionally, these
two Gulf states, which are the most likely to present a direct mili-
tary challenge to or to work subversion on the Arab side of the Gulf,
are preoccupied with the war. Nonetheless, the Gulf war will con-
tinue to be a major source of tension and instability in the Persian
Gulf region for the indefinite future. While holding both countries
in a hostage-like grip in the coming years, the conflict has the
potential to erupt repeatedly into full-scale hostilities and to
expand to neighboring states, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula.
The persistence of Iranian-Iraqi tension will enhance and strengthen
the role of Saudi Arabia in the political, military, and security
affairs of the Gulf (already evidenced by the Saudi role in the
GCC). The continuation of the conflict, however, is not the only
factor influencing this development, because there is Peninsula-
wide concern about Iran's oft-stated goals of exporting its revolution,
16

Turning to the other Arab Gulf states, they have essentially
similar regimes and face similar problems stemming mainly from their
oil wealth and rapid development. The people of these countries
share elements of a common heritage. Perhaps the single most im-
portant such element is Islam. Although all Arab Gulf States adhere
to the Islamic faith, and all are ruled by Sunni Muslims (save for
Oman), their individual perceptions of the role of Islam in the
affairs of state vary significantly.
Generally the impact of Islam on interstate relations has
been both positive and negative. The conservative interpretation of
Islam by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for example, has brought them closer
together, but has created serious conflicts between Saudi Arabia and
Iraq (principally because of Iraq's secularity and relations with
the Soviet Union). The Shia-Sunni division within Islam itself has
also affected relations among Arab Gulf states. This factor plays
even a more significant role since the establishment of a Shi i te
Islamic Republic in Iran. Religious differences in the Gulf do not
have the direct political implications that, for example, they do in
Northern Ireland. But in the Gulf, allegiance to a particular re-
ligious group is a major determinant of one's identity, which is the
12
basic building block upon which loyalty to the state is constructed.
All of the Arab Gulf states are ruled by authoritarian
regimes, which are solidly based on tribalism as expressed in family-
centered rule. As with Islam, tribalism has both positive and
negative effects. The tribal origin of the Arab Gulf regimes has
had a positive impact on their relations with each other. With a
17

common interest in preserving family rule, they have been able to
conduct friendly relations with each other and to settle some dis-
putes. Alternatively, the tribal nature of these states has made
them suspicious of the "secular" political ideology of Iraq.
The states of the Persian Gulf possess a similar cultural
heritage in terms of social origin and religious affiliation but
their actual populations are often very dissimilar. Except for
Iraq, the Arab Gulf states have small indigenous populations, with
correspondingly large nonindigenous minorities. They have had to
rely on hundreds of thousands of foreign workers. The political
fallout of these demographic facts cannot be overstated and will
be covered in more depth later (see Chapter IV Economic Issues).
In short, the Gulf states show commonality in environment, religion,
demography, and ideology but they are not without their problems.
E. PROBLEMS AND ISSUES
The division of the Gulf region is considered by many Arab his-
torians as a direct result of British policy in the region which was
divided into several emirates and sheikhdoms whose political borders
13
"have nothing in common with any other borders in the world."
Territorial disputes have long been a basic political fact of life
in the Gulf. Not only are there few permanent features in the
desert terrain characteristic enough to permit a definitely described
boundary line, but also the need for boundary lines did not exist in
the region until the development of oil resources. Some of the more
noteworthy territorial disputes are as follows:
18

- Buraimi Oasis; Saudi Arabia, Oman and Abu Dhabi
- Shatt a! -Arab; Iran and Iraq
- Iraqi claim to Kuwait and some Kuwaiti islands
- Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands; Iran and the UAE
- Iranian claim to Bahrain
- Bahraini claim to northern Qatar
- Gulf median line; between Arab and Persian side of Gulf
Although some disputes have been resolved by patient negotiations,
there are still several cases where serious conflict could occur
and territorial uncertainties remains one of the thorniest issues
that the Gulf states are still facing.
Another problem for some of the Gulf states is the exhaustion
of oil, which provides their only source of revenue. The fact that
reserves will not last have made these states (Oman for one) aware
first, of the need for getting themselves the benefits brought by
these riches, and second, to develop alternative sources of revenue
for the time when all reserves will have dried up. Depending on
oil as the sole source of revenues is now seen as posing immediate
political problems in an area whose prosperity has been based solely
on the production and exportation of oil.
One cannot discuss Arab interstatal relations without some
mention of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has affected the Gulf
states for many years, especially since the 1973 war and embargo.
As a general rule, the impact of this issue has been positive and
the differences which have frequently appeared have not been per-
mitted by the states concerned to destroy their relations. For
19

example, Oman was the only Gulf state not to go along with the
ostracization of Egypt after Camp David, yet it was not excluded
from membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As the
situation stands today, Oman may be an important catalyst aiding
the return of Egypt to the Arab fold. Egypt could then become an
important supplier of manpower and equipment for the defense of the
Gulf states, and, therefore, an important asset to the GCC.
Probably the most important and influential issue confronting
the Arab Gulf states today is the question of Gulf security and the
regional role of the superpowers. As already mentioned, the problem
of Gulf security has been a recurrent theme ever since Britain with-
drew its forces from Aden in the early seventies. Gulf security is
the underlying theme of the subsequent chapters of this thesis. The
foregoing broad brush treatment of the Gulf and its problems will be
distilled down to some specifics including a closer look at Oman,
the newly formed Gulf Cooperation Council, and the possibility of a
greater Western Allied participation in Gulf security.
20
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The historical heritage of Oman is most important in under-
standing the present day policies of Muscat. Apart from the Saudi
pride in its history as the home of the prophet, no other Gulf
country has for so long been so obsessed with dreams of returning
to its former greatness. Oman is one of the oldest political
entities of the Arabian Peninsula, unique in having kept its inde-
pendence during most of its history. Its strategic geographic
location made it the meeting place of many cultures, and this
shaped its history accordingly.
Oman has been inhabited since the end of the latest Ice Age,
about 12,000 B.C. The first inhabitants, who were to introduce
copper to the world in the fourth millenium B.C., are believed to
have been Sumerian. They gave the name Magan to the area at the
entrance of the Gulf. The Sumerians were followed by the Chaldeans,
and then by Oman bin Oahtan bin Hud, who ruled the country and gave
it his name. Assyrians, Babylonians, Sabeans and Persians came
and went in turn. Early Oman boasted a flourishing civilization
which was part of the great civilization that spanned Persia and
beyond into Afghanistan in the third millenium B.C.
Oman's coasts, then as now, lie on one of the world's most
important sea routes. Omani maritime activity dates back to the
22

third millenium B.C. and in fact the first record of long distance
sea trade in the history of the world is of the trips taken by the
Magan boats which sailed to (Jr laden with copper and other goods.
Thousands of Omani plied the Indian Ocean in their distinctive craft
and, centuries later, an Omani seaman was among those who discovered
the route to India by the Cape of Good Hope.
2
By the end of the
first millenium B.C., Oman's most important commercial activity
was the production and export of frankincense from Dhofar, a product
much in demand in the ancient world.
Oman's recorded history began with the advent of the Arabs
in the second century B.C., when two Arab tribes, the Yemeni and
the Nizari, migrated to Oman. Several other tribes followed after
the collapse of the Ma 'rib Dam in 120 A.D. One of the first tribes
of that time was Al-Azad, from whom Oman's ruling family today is
descended.
In the sixth century, Omani tribesmen embraced Islam and
in fact sent a delegation to Medina subsequent to the Prophet
3
Mohammad's death in 632 A.D. Within the first centruy of the
coming of Islam, the Ibadi movement, which evolved in Basra, had
won many converts in Oman. The Ibadi s taught that a man's good
works proved his inner worth. They believed in electing the most
suitable leader--imam--if one were available, whether or not he was
from the Prophet's family. Imams were given both spiritual and
temporal authority.
After the rise of Islam in the seventh century, tribalism
and religion in Oman became intimately interconnected. Ibadi
23

religious ideology and tribalism are traditional forces that stand
in the way of political centralization and are so important to the
understanding of Oman today that they deserve the following more
detailed examinations.
2. Ibadite Islam
The ruling family and an estimated 50 percent of Oman's
population belong to the Ibadi sect of Islam. It is an offshoot of
the Khariji movement which broke away from the main body of Islam
during the reign of the fourth Caliph, Ali, in 658 A.D. The
Kharijis were noted for their extreme fanaticism and were funda-
mentalists who believed that no other guides to spiritual, social,
and political life were needed except the Quran and the life of the
4
Prophet. After breaking with Ali, they became fragmented into a
number of sects, of which one of the more moderate, the followers
of Ibad (named after Abdullah bin Ibad), migrated from Iraq to Oman
in the eighth century to escape persecution by the Sunni Umayyad
5
Caliph. The Ibadis elected their first Imam in 749 A.D.
The Ibadi ideal was to restore Islam to its pristine con-
dition at the time of Mohammad. The Ibadi community can exist in
one of several states determined by the religious leadership. A
state of "concealment" occurs during periods of persecution, when
individual Ibadis are free to practice "dissimulation" to hide
their true religion and thus save their lives. In a state of danger
a special Imam is appointed to lead the defense of the community.
When Ibadis count themselves at least half as strong as their adver-
saries (in men, arms, supplies, etc.), they may pass into a state of
24

"manifistation*" at which time an Imam can again be elected openly.
Ibadism eventually became the official religion of the Omani state.
The Imamate is an institution out of which the contemporary
Sultanate grew, and which existed in parallel with the Sultanate at
various periods during the last two centuries. Ahmad ibn Said Al Bu
Said, the founder of Oman's present ruling dynasty, was elected Imam
in 1749 as a result of his success in driving Persian invaders from
Oman. In the face of persistent tribal and religious dissension,
the Al Bu Said's eventually dropped all pretentions to the title of
Imam and ruled as secular leaders only (Sultans). This opened the
way for frequent attempts throughout the 19th and 20th centuries by
tribal and religious leaders in Oman's interior to establish an
Imamate according to Ibadi principles. In the face of such re-
bellions (some of which are covered in a later section), the Sul-
tans could generally hold on to the coastal areas, while their power
over the mountainous and desert interior waxed and waned. The
Imamate is now considered abolished by the Government of Oman, and
the office of the Imam has been vacant since 1955.
Today, Oman's various religious establishments and their
leaders constitute a large and geographically diffuse interest
group. Their political power is limited, however, by the religious
heterogeneity of the population. While roughly half of all Omani s,
including the ruling family, are Ibadi, the population of Dhofar
Province (one-third of Oman's territory), the Musandam Peninsula,
Buraimi Oasis, and Oman's Arabian Sea islands (Masirah for one) is





As a final comment on the Ibadis, they are noted for their
prayer and piety and resemble the Wahhabis in their tendency to
look upon other Muslim sects as religiously lax compared with
themselves. The Ibadis are sometimes regarded unjustifiably as
puritannical because their mosques are simple and generally devoid
of ornament, and because music is not permitted in the Ibadi in-
terior of the country. But they are not an intolerant people and
are capable of making common-sense exceptions to their own moral
rules. For example, the faithful who live in cold, mountainous
Q
regions are given medical dispensation to drink wine.
3. Tribal ism
Tribalism has dominated Omani politics since the beginning
of the Arab migration into the area 2,000 years ago. Ibadi doc-
trines regarding the election, status, and functions of the Imam
appear to be derived from the older institution of the tribal
sheikh. A particularly strong-willed, articulate, and politically
astute sheikh could elevate himself to the status of a "paramount
sheikh," uniting a number of tribes and clans under his leadership.
Like a paramount sheikh, an especially capable Ibadi Imam could
unite enough of the interior tribes to threaten the coast. In this
regard, an Imam had the special appeal of religion, used as an
ideology, to legitimize his claims.
John Duke Anthony sought to identify the major tribes by
location in 1975. Clearly, the Al Bu Said was the most important,
although at least a dozen tribes were greater numerically. The
Omani tribes belong to either of two factions: Ghafiri, after
26

the Bani Ghafir tribe, and Hinawi, after the Bani Hina. The origins
of these factions can be traced to the migration of the northern
Arab tribes into Oman after the southern tribes had settled there.
The Ghafiri
-Hinawi split is described as a continuation of this
ancient "northern-southern" rivalry. The Bani Hina were known for
centuries as Yamanis, or "southern Arabs," whereas the Bani Ghafir
were known as "northern Arabs." 12 The Ghafiri-Hinawi rivalry grew
out of the civil war which was precipitated by Imamate succession
problems in the early 18th century. The conflict escalated from
simply a dynastic struggle to a countrywide alignment of inter-
1
1
tribal forces that divides Omani tribes to this day. The religious
factor compounds the rivalry. Ever since the paramount sheikh of the
Bani Ghafir began recruiting Sunni tribes against the Hinawis during
their 18th century civil war, the Ghafiri faction has been character-
ized as Sunni and the Hinawi as Ibadi.
There is an interesting aspect of the Ghafiri-Hinawi dichotomy.
Tribes with traditional feuds generally chose opposite sides of the
division. Since identification with one confederation was not abso-
lute, tribes could and did switch allegiance. As a result of this
fluidity in alliances, it required an exceptionally skillful indi-
vidual to secure the support of tribes from both the Ghafiri and
Hinawi factions in order to claim leadership over inner Oman. More-
over, the only key to cooperation between the two confederations lay
in the religious appeal; only the symbol of the Imamate could unite
the majority of the Omani tribes. The Sultan does not wield the
symbolic power (as would an Imam) necessary to maintain tribal
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cohesiveness in Oman, and therefore, there exists an undercurrent of
tribal strife.
Out of hundreds of tribes or subtribes scattered across Oman,
about a dozen besides the Al Bu Said tribe itself have been im-
portant to the continuation of the Sultanate. Their significance
stems from a combination of factors including size, location, live-
lihood, character and orientation of leadership, religious affili-
ation, and identification with one side or the other in the
Ghafiri-Hinawi split. The following is a listing of the more
salient Omani tribes and their significance:
- Bani Ghafir, Bani Umr, and Hawasinah--They are known for their
military prowess. They have also been the most fiercely loyal
of any tribes to the Sultan. Their members form a substantial
number of the askars
, a kind of praetorian guard for the ruling
family and government posts throughout the country.
- Shihuh and Habus--They inhabit the strategic Musandam Peninsula.
Some of these tribesmen have accepted UAE citizenship and have
embarassed the Sultan.
- Duru--They inhabit the Dhahirah region where Oman's oilfields
are located. They supported the Sultan during the crucial
1950' s (the time of oil exploration) and helped ensure stability
during the development of the country's oil industry.
- Janabah--The tribe on Masirah Island.
- Mahrah, Al Kathir, and Qarawi--Dhofari tribes. Mahrah and Al
Kathir are historically and culturally oriented toward South
Yemen and the Qarawi is the tribe of the Sultan's mother (who
has considerable influence within the ruling family).
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- AT Hirth—Their paramount sheikh held a powerful position under
the previous Sultan and had contracted an engagement between
Sultan Qabus and his daughter. After Qabus toppled his father
in 1970 he married his first cousin and therefore never
honored the Al Hirth tribe engagement. Many among the Hirth
resent this failure to honor the contract, which could cause
future problems.
- Bani Rujam--The premier Ghafiri tribe in Oman.
- Bani Hina—The namesake of the Hinawi factions and commands the
inland approaches to the Omani heartland.
Following the 1970 coup, when Qabus overthrew his father,
there was a fundamental shift in political power; the new regime
was no longer dependent on the support of tribal figures. The gov-
ernment machinery expanded and key posts were filled by men from
merchant families, educated Omanis returning from exile under the
old Sultan, and representatives of various other minority groups.
Tribal organization and tribal confederations were no longer a major
factor in Omani national politics. Although one or two ministerial
positions were reserved for representatives of interior tribes, the
majority of the sheikhs were bypassed. According to John Peterson,
tribalism as a factor in the political life of Oman is declining in
importance. Only the ruling family continues to play an important,
central political role, and could represent an important bridge be-
tween the ancient tribal society and the modern state. One must





Sultan Qabus is the 14th successor to a dynasty which began
in 1749 and was punctuated with civil war, corruption, various
stages of internal geographic division, intrigue, treason, and poli-
tical assassination. The prominent personalities of the current Al
1
8
Bu Said family are as follows:
- Qabus ibn Said Al Bu Said ; Sultan, Prime Minister, Minister of
Defense, and Minister of Finance.
- Badr ibn Suud Al Bu Said ; Minister of Interior.
- Salim Nasir Al Bu Said ; Minister of Communication.
- Fahd ibn Mahmud Al Bu Said ; Deputy Prime Minister for Legal
Affairs.
- Faisal ibn Ali ibn Faisal Al Bu Said ; Minister of National
Heritage and Culture.
- Hamad ibn Hamud Al Bu Said ; Minister of the Sultan's Affairs.
- Fahr ibn Taimur Al Bu Said ; Deputy Prime Minister for Security
and Defense Affairs.
- Sayyid Thuwayin ibn Shihab ; Governor of Muscat, personal advisor
and cousin of Qabus.
In addition to the Al Bu Saids listed above, about a dozen local
Governors (about one-third of the total) are close and influential
relatives of the Sultan. The Sultan has no brothers and as of
late-1982 no crown prince nor successor has been named. The
Sultan's relatives do not have the political ascendancy enjoyed by
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many of the royalty of the Arabian Peninsula.
Since Sultan Qabus functions as absolute ruler of Oman,
and approves all foreign and domestic policies, an examination of
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his personal history would be germane. Qabus was born on 18 November
1940. "An intelligent boy, Qabus led a lonely, restricted, and iso-
lated childhood, secluded at the palace in Salalah, permitted neither
friends, servants, nor any manner of social intercourse with the ex-
ception of that related to his studies." 20 His first "escape" from
Oman came at sixteen years-old when he was sent to a private English
school for Arab princes, Bury St. Edmunds, at York. While there, he
became a serious student, expert horseman, and acquired a lifelong
taste for classical music (he also loved to drive fast cars). 21 At
twenty-one, he graduated from Sandhurst as a lieutenant in the
Cameronians. After an around-the-world trip, he returned to Bury
St. Edmunds to study government and economics; he subsequently de-
veloped an interest in oil economics. In 1964, he was ordered by
his father to return to Salalah supposedly to memorize the Quran and
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to study the history of the Omani tribes. He was kept under vir-
tual house arrest in a four-room residence adjoining the Royal
Palace. On 23 July 1970, at the age of 29, Qabus (reportedly with
British help) overthrew his father and became Sultan.
Sultan Qabus is one of the most reserved and enigmatic of
the Arab rulers, a young and dignified man whose presence seems to
evoke impressions of imperial grandeur from the days of the warrior
Caliphs. In his perception of Oman's historical importance and
destiny, the Sultan brings to mind the Shah of Iran, with whose
regime he had close relations. But the resemblance does not go much
further; Qabus lacks the Shah's self-righteous severity and, though





Sultan Qabus is a firm believer in his own and his country's
destiny and his objective is no less than the restoration of the
country's imperial status in the Arab world, an attitude which in-
evitably brings him into conflict with other Gulf rulers who have
equal dreams but more shaky historical precedents. The Sultan, how-
ever, pays little heed to the grumbling of neighbors. Both Omani
and foreign advisors pander to his nationalism and only those who
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encourage the great dream find their way into his courtly entourage.
Traditionally a lover of things British since his Sandhurst
days, Qabus has been moving towards the U.S. as a supporter for his
national plans. He prefers the British, but realizes that the days
of British power and influence are numbered. He perceives the main
threat to Oman as Soviet-directed (either through South Yemen or
directly at Gulf oilfields) and is the only Gulf ruler who responded
to former U.S. Secretary of State Haig's idea of a "strategic con-
sensus" against the USSR. Britain may have advantages in the
quietly efficient way it has run Oman's affairs for the Sultan, but
when it comes to a 1 980 ' s threat from a superpower, the only viable
support in his view can come from another superpower.
Sultan Qabus is popular in Oman. The contrast of life in
the capital and in the country compared with ten years ago is still
startling enough to remind the population of what he has achieved.
Plenty of gaps still remain, however, in terms of rural development
and housing for the poor. The Sultan is often criticized for his
lavish life-style and palaces and for spending too much time removed
25
from daily affairs in the distant southern Palace at Salalah.
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But Qabus is by no means out of touch with the country. In January
1982, the first meeting of Oman's Consultative Council, which was
inaugurated in November of last year, took place. After 12 years
of ruling Oman, Sultan Qabus has undertaken a new democratic step
which has the objective of having the Omani people exercise some
type of control over their own destiny. The decisions of the Council,
however, are not binding and are only advisory in nature. Qabus also
diligently consults religious leaders on matters of policy. He has
cooled his support for Camp David considerably, feeling the internal
mood of support for the Palestinians, and has sought a more accept-
able regional role for Oman by repairing relations with Saudi Arabia
and by becoming a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
B. CHALLENGES TO THE SULTANATE
1 . Internal
The history of Oman has consistently been one of division,
dichotomies, geographical isolation, and open civil strife. Never
close to the Arab states of the Peninsula, Oman's traditional orien-
tation has been toward the subcontinent (differences with Saudi
Arabia in the 1950's and 1960's delayed diplomatic relations until
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the 1970's). This isolation was aggravated by Sultan Qabus 1 friend-
ship with the Shah of Iran, Oman's support for the Camp David peace
process, and in identifying openly with Western powers. Today,
Oman is vulnerable along a number of fronts. The resuscitation of
the Dhofar insurgency by neighboring PDRY (reinforced by the Soviet
Union, Bulgaria, and East Germany) is one possibility. Another is
the expansion of the Khomeini revolution and the Gulf war. A third
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possibility is a domestic movement, perhaps with military assistance,
opposed to the apparent isolation of the Sultan from his people.
Oman provides a tempting target for destabilization, both because
of its regional "pariah" status and because of its overt pro-Western
alignment.
In order to understand the current threats confronting Oman,
a look at the more salient past conflicts is appropos. As previously
mentioned, Oman is made up of some 200 Arab tribes which had emi-
grated before and after the advent of Islam (circa 600 A.D.). Addi-
tionally, Oman had always remained independent (more or less) of the
Islamic Imperial capitals. This independence was expressed primarily
through adherence to Ibadhism, a militant brand of Shia Islam. The
Ibadhism of the interior tribes of Oman recognized a selected Imam
as the sole religious and political authority and resented any control
28
by the Sultan.
This militarily isolationist character of the interior
tribes also served the function of defense against the penetration
by European imperial forces. During the heyday of the Omani commer-
cial empire in the 18th century the Al Bu Said dynasty replaced the
Yaruba Sultans who had ruled since their recapture of Muscat from
the Portuguese in 1650. The Al Bu Said dynasty acquiesced to a
division of political and religious power to be exercised by the
Sultan and Imam respectively. The coastal economy collapsed in
1860 and a restoration of Imamic rule in Muscat (the interior tribal





In 1871 the British invaded Muscat and restored the Al Bu
Said to power. British military intervention was subsequently re-
quired in 1877, 1883, around the turn of the century, and during and
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after the first World War. Oman's importance to the British was
strategic, not economic, and related to the security of Britain's
Indian Empire and secondarily to the control of trade and resources
in the Gulf region. In 1920 the British sponsored an agreement be-
tween the Sultan and the tribes, the Treaty of Seeb, in which the
Sultan in effect granted full autonomy to the tribes in exchange
for their promise not to attack the coast. This de facto partition
kept the country as pacific as the British required until the mid-
1950' s, when the search for new oil reserves in the interior led to
conflict.
2. Oil-precipitated Conflicts
In 1952, after the possibility of large oil reserves in the
Buraimi Oasis were confirmed, Saudi Arabia exercised its claim to
the disputed territory by sending troops (armed by ARAMCO) to
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occupy it. Britain protested and led the Sultan's army to re-
occupy the oasis in 1955. The U.S., backing Saudi Arabia
,
righteously denounced "British aggression" but otherwise let the
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matter rest. The Saudis had no choice but to do the same.
A more serious conflict had erupted in Oman in 1954. Pro-
tests from the Imam over alleged oil -prospecting team violations of
the Treaty of Seeb prompted the British to make a show of force.
In late 1955 the British occupied three towns, centers of Islamic
strength. Meanwhile, the Imam's brother maneuvered to get Saudi
(and ARAMCO) arms and backing and to raise a force of Omani exiles
35

which were fashioned into an Oman Liberation Army. They formalized
their cause with demands for an independent Omani interior and the
withdrawal of all Muscati and British troops to the coast. They
received diplomatic backing from the Arab League and even from the
Soviet Bloc
. Arms and men were smuggled up from the coast, and a
coordinated tribal uprising was planned.
In the Spring and Summer of 1957 the Omani interior rose up
against the occupation forces. This precipitated the 1958 visit of
Julian Amery, the British Minister of Defense, to discuss further
strategy and to establish the new Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF).
What the Amery agreement did was to provide for equipment and
running costs, and a framework from which serving British Officers
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could be seconded to the SAF. Meanwhile, the rebels were acquir-
ing American-made mines and mortars from Saudi Arabia and using them
to harass and ambush British forces. By the end of January 1959,
the British had finally supressed the rebellion. Saudi Arabia con-
tinued to support the Imam (vice the Sultan) until 1962 when events
in Yemen demanded an end to this inter-imperialist squabble between
Saudi Arabia (backed by the U.S.) and Britain.
3. Dhofar Rebellion
The military coup against the Imamic regime in Yemen in
September 1962 was the most important political event to occur in
Arabia in modern times. It provided political and military sanctu-
ary for launching an armed struggle a year later against the
British occupation in Aden and the Protectorates; a struggle which
eventually produced the first regime in the Arab world committed to
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a Marxist-Leninist path to development. In 1964 the contagion of
liberation reached eastward to Dhofar where on 9 June 1965, a
guerrilla war began against the Sultan of Oman under the banner of
Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF).
Dhofar came under Omani rule near the end of the 19th cen-
tury, after at least several centuries of existence as an autonomous
fiefdom. With the support of the British, Omani rule was established
in 1879, but only on the coastal plain. Dhofar was never integrated
into the Sultanate of Oman but regarded formally as a dependency and
subjected to the crudest kind of Sultanic plunder. Said bin Taimur,
the Sultan from 1932 to 1970, exercised a greater degree of control
over Dhofar. He married a Dhofari woman by whom he had one son,
the current Sultan Qabus. After 1958, Sultan Taimur moved his resi-
dence from Muscat to Salalah, from where he could directly supervise
the exploitation of Dhofar at an intensity greater than that imposed
on Oman proper. Here lie the roots of the Dhofari rationale for its
anti-Sultanic revolt
.
The profound political transformation of Arab national liber-
ation movements after the June war and the NLF seizure of state power
in South Yemen in 1967 was manifested in the second DLF congress in
1968. It was at this meeting that the name of the organization was
changed to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied
Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), a decision that reflected an unequivocal shift
to an ideology committed to scientific socialism and the adoption of
a comprehensive revolutionary strategy. This radicalization was
supported by the outrageous policies of reprisal and punishment
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devised by Sultan Taimur to crush the struggle. The coastal towns
were encircled with barbed wire. Dhofaris were banned from travel
or service in the army. An economic blockade designed to starve out
guerrillas inflicted dire hardships on most of the Dhofari population
and helped to build the ranks of the popular front.
By 1970 Sultan Taimur' s government had come to be regarded
as the most reactionary and isolationist in the area, if not the
world; slavery was still common (note that this is in 1970 ) and many
medieval prohibitions were still in force. The Sultan's refusal to
use oil revenues (first exports began in 1967) for any purpose
other than the building up of his armed forces had particularly
embarrassed the British, the oil companies, and the neighboring
states, and this attitude provided ideal conditions for the Dhofar
rebellion. In July 1970 when Qabus deposed his father, he announced
his intention to transform the country by using the oil revenues and
asked the rebels for help in developing the country; the rebel re-
sponse was minimal and they appeared to think that the palace coup
had changed little.
The progress achieved since the coup did have some impact on
the insurgents' following, with a number of defections to the Sultan's
forces, but fighting continued. In 1972, SAF forces attacked the
PDRY border area and in 1973 Iranian troops came to the aid of the
Sultan who was also receiving assistance from Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, Pakistan, and India. In late 1975 the Sultan claimed com-
plete victory over the insurgents and on 11 March 1976 a cease fire
between Oman and the PDRY was negotiated by Saudi Arabia. In 1978 a
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renewal of the insurrection occurred with reports of increasing
support for the PFLO (name changed from PFLOAG in 1974). The PFLO,
however, has become largely an external force and has achieved
little success in attracting adherents within Oman, although the
Governor of Dhofar was assassinated in 1979 and renewed insurgency
was reported. In January 1981 Oman closed the border with the PDRY
to discourage a renewal of insurgency.
Oman's relations with the PDRY are still ^ery much strained.
Oman insists that South Yemen must stop interfering in Oman's in-
ternal affairs and in particular end its support for the PFLO
guerrillas. Alternatively, Aden has laid down three conditions for
normal relations with Oman. First, foreign (i.e. American) bases
in Oman must be closed down; second, Oman must end "provocative
maneuvers" along the frontier; and third, it must "return to the
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Arab fold," renounce Camp David, and end collaboration with Egypt.
Currently, Oman enjoys strong support from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
the U.S. and it is hard to see how any lasting reconciliation with
Aden can be achieved.
Oman's threat perceptions, both internal and external,
necessitate the maintenance of an armed force and external arms
assistance. Additionally, the need to be armed stems not only from
the perceived threats to the Sultanate, but also from the basic
psyche of the Arab. Throughout the Arabian Peninsula, and cer-
tainly in Oman, it has been regarded for generations as essential for
a man to be armed; a man who does not carry a weapon, in Oman a
rifle and a dagger, is not a man. His virility is in question.
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Although this attitude is beginning to change as popular education
spreads, it still remains a most powerful influence. A boy at
puberty is circumcised and given a rifle; both acts are important
badges of his manhood.
Thus, a strong tribe is a well-armed tribe, the respect by
which it is held by other tribes being in direct proportion to the
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number of armed men it can parade. Taken to the next stage, a
nation, as an amalgam of tribes, will only be respected in the world
if it is seen to be militarily strong. Arming with sophisticated
weaponry is not done to counter any specific threat but in many
cases just to be armed. Just as an unarmed man is not a man, an
unarmed nation is not a nation.
Oman suffers doubly from this international game of keeping
up appearances because the country could be said to be situated in a
street with rich neighbors. Iran, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
and Iraq are all near to or bordering Oman and are all profligate
spenders on modern arms and advanced weapons systems (one need only
mention AWACs). Oman has to be seen, at least in some Omani eyes,
to be holding up its head in such a neighborhood.
Per capita military spending in the Middle East is the
world's highest and Oman is right up there at number six with $1,060
(behind Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Israel). The
world's next highest per capita military spenders, the U.S. and
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Libya, each spend about $600. Oman spends 18 times more on its
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military than on education and 15 times more than on health.
Because of an extremely poor indigenous defense manufacturing
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capability, Oman relies almost exclusively on foreign sources to
fulfill its arms requirements.




Oman became the first British protectorate in the region
and is now the last bastion of British influence. As far back as
1798, under the shadow of the French advance during the Napoleonic
wars, the British coerced the coastal tribes of Oman to sign a
series of treaties which gave Britain exclusive rights to control
their foreign affairs and defense. On a number of occasions the
Oman tribes rose against British rule (the first was in 1895); in
1960 the UN General Assembly passed resolutions urging Britain to
recognize the independence of Oman and withdraw her forces.
A watershed for the British in the area was its withdrawal
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from east of the Suez in 1968. This is the date both when the
arms race in the Gulf began and when the U.S. was forced to re-
evaluate its regional policy, which was predicated on a British
political and military presence. In the years immediately follow-
ing the announcment of British troop withdrawals, there was a mad
scramble among affected Mideast countries to build up their own
armed forces to fill the military vacuum certain to ensue. These
countries, especially Oman, being familiar with British arms and
military doctrine
,
quite naturally made Britain the main bene-
ficiary of their petrodollars. In the months following the
withdrawal announcements, arms sales, complete with advisors, were
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announced with Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Oman .
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Two different sources list the following monetary amounts
for past arms imports to Oman: $67 million ($21 million British)
4?between 1967 and 1975 c and $114 million ($60 million British) be-
tween 1973 and 1977. 43 Although the U.S. (which will be discussed
in the next section), France, Italy, Canada, Jordan, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia have supplied arms to Oman, its most sophisticated
weapons have been supplied by the United Kingdom. In fact, 1974




Assorted transport aircraft 18
Fast patrol boats 4
Rapier air defense system 1




Deliveries of the above listed systems were completed in 1977.
Since 1977, additional contracts have been reported including ones
for a support ship, a fast-attack missile craft, two Province-class
46fast patrol boats, 12 more Jaguars, and 30 Chieftain tanks. (See
Appendix A for Oman's current Order of Battle)
There are several rationales behind British arms sales to
Oman (and other Gulf states), one of which is simply related to the
economics of the exports. Another is related to continuing British
political interests in its ex colonies (although Oman was not a
colony de jure, it was de facto). Arms sales to Oman, complete
with advisors, is a way of maintaining ties and influence for the
British. Additionally, the UK does not really have to push or hard
sell its equipment, rather Oman desires British equipment because
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the Omani armed forces have had previous experience with it. Another
factor is the large presence (800+) of British seconded troops in
47
Oman. One must also remember that Sultan Qabus is a graduate of
the British Military school at Sandhurst and his relations with the
British are excellent.
It is common to describe the history of the British connection
with the Gulf in terms of the assertion and maintenance of British
predominance in response to a recognition of the strategic importance
of the area. The defense of India, the defense of the routes to the
east, and the defense of economic interest each played some part in
the molding of the British policy. British predominance was pri-
marily the consequence of a need for someone to keep the peace and
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the failure of the regional powers to do so. Today, it seems that
the U.S. is trying to play a larger role in the area with similar
rationales but with the additional goal of seeking base rights. The
British were, by and large, successful; but will the U.S. be sucess-
ful or simply exacerbate an already touchy situation?
2. United States
Direct U.S. interests in the Gulf originated in Oman in the
1820' s. At that time the Sultanate was a leading maritime power in
the Indian Ocean. Muscat was one of the great ports of the Indian
Ocean, and Zanzibar, a dependency of the Sultan, was the center of
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the slave trade, both East and West. It only takes a glance at
the map of the Middle East to see why Oman is of such strategic
importance to the Western world. Located at the southeastern corner
of the Arabian Peninsula, Oman shares with Iran the guardianship of
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of the Strait of Hormuz. The romantic exaggeration of the strategic
importance of the "guardian of the West's jugular" aside, Oman's
geography has become more important in the face of both an unfriendly
Iran and Soviet power in nearby Afghanistan.
Despite the obvious economic, political, and strategic con-
cerns, the Gulf did not become a specific area of policy interest
until 1968 when the British announced their withdrawal plans. Prior
to that time, the U.S. had developed close bilateral relations in-
cluding arms sales and military training with Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The U.S. had also maintained a small naval facility at Bahrain since
1949. The first post-1968 U.S. policy for the Gulf was reflected in
Joseph Sisco's five principles of 1972 and the now oft referred to
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"two pillar" policy; there were no specific provisions for Oman.
It is not the intent to provide a blow by blow account of the evolu-
tion of U.S. policy in the Gulf, but rather to focus on Oman.
The first significant American link with contemporary Oman
was in 1974 when the U.S. Ambassador presented his credentials.
SuDsequently, to supplement its British hardware, Oman placed its
initial order for U.S. -manufactured arms in 1975 (Oman became eli-
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gible to order U.S. military equipment in January 1973). Follow-
ing a visit of Sultan Qabus to Washington in 1975, it was announced
that the U.S. would supply Oman with TOW missiles. In return, the
U.S. requested permission for "occasional use" of the Omani air
base on Masirah Island . The TOW missile sale was seen by many ob-
servers as simply the opening wedge towards increased American
military sales. In fact, in January 1980, Sultan Qabus reportedly
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asked the U.S. for $800 million worth of military equipment. There
are several reports that indicate that the U.S. responded positively
to the Omani requests. In February 1980, there were reports that
the U.S. and Great Britain had packaged a $300 million arms deal
but that the final agreement was being held back for want of finan-
ciers. Saudi Arabia or Kuwait most likely financed this deal and
will probably finance future deals. 52 After all, the U.S. needs
bases in the area and Oman is certainly in a key strategic location;
it behooves the West to be creative when it comes to packaging future
arms deals.
U.S. base rights in Oman, particularly on Masirah Island,
have been targetted by U.S. planners since 1973. In September 1973
an Army Colonel paid a three week visit to Oman and reported on the
"significant" air strip and necessary support facilities on Masirah.
In June 1974, Sultan Qabus informed the British of the U.S. request
for "occasional" use of Masirah. The State Department sent a repre-
sentative to Muscat for discussions. During the 1975 Qabus-Washington
visit, the TOW missiles obviously got the U.S. something. The fol-
lowing from the 13 February 1975 Christian Science Monitor is ger-
mane:
"According to State Department sources in Washington, the
U.S. request to use the British airbase on Masirah Island off
the coast of Oman was made by Henry Kissinger to Sultan Qabus
when the latter visited Washington in January. These sources
assert that the move was initiated by Kissinger himself, and
that neither the State Department, the Pentagon, nor the
National Security Council had anything to do with it." b,i
In early 1980 the U.S. announced that Oman had agreed to
allow the U.S. military the use of Omani "facilities" in return for
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some $100 million in military aid. For Qabus, the arrangement locks
the U.S. into backing his regime, which had previously depended on
the Shah of Iran for this service. Even before the British relin-
guished Masirah in March 1977, the U.S. had been using it for re-
fueling P-3's based on Diego Garcia. Since November 1979, U.S. C-141's
have used Masirah to ferry supplies to the carrier task forces in the
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Arabian Sea area. In April 1980 Under-Secretary of Defense Robert
Komer testified that the U.S. was seeking to upgrade the air bases
at Seeb and Thumrayt as well as Masirah, and the ports of Mutrah and
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Salalah. Both Thumrayt and Salalah are in Dhofar Province, which
was pacified just a few years ago with the assistance of thousands
of Iranian troops and U.S. -supplied weapons.
The U.S. -Oman Military Access Agreement was concluded in
June 1980 and gives to U.S. military forces access to certain Omani
ports and airfields through implementing arrangements as mutually
agreed. The exact initial arrangements that have been worked out
are not for public record but consist largely of aircraft refuel
-
ings, crew rests, and similar activities. The U.S. has agreed to
upgrade Omani facilities not only for U.S. purposes but also for
Oman's permanent use through a military construction program. The
U.S. is "increasing the supply of military equipment in areas where
American military equipment appropriately meets the Sultanate's de-
fense needs.' The U.S. also has a planned economic aid program
that goes hand in glove with the military agreement. The planned
aid program "will assist the process of equitable development in
Oman and provide tangible evidence to the Omani population of the
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benefits of our broadened relationship. 57 From the available infor-
mation on the agreement, there seems to be one very significant
clause which the U.S. would certainly liked adjusted in the future.
It says that no U.S. military units will be stationed in Oman, nor
will the U.S. government seek to do so .
U.S. basing in Oman, and especially on Masirah Island, would
be invaluable for any U.S. policies in the area. Experts familiar
with Masirah's facilities have estimated that the British could have
staged 25,000 forces through the island fairly rapidly, if necessary,
in meeting their regional commitments. As a staging base, the
island offers political as well as security advantages. Sparsely
inhabited, there is less of the risk of the kind of local frictions
that are so often encountered around mainland facilities. Sultan
Qabus himself has said that a firm position must be taken up by the
Western powers and this Firm position must clearly be supported by
adequate "military over-the-horizon power" if deterrence is to be
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convincing. In a way, Masirah Island is over the horizon!
The U.S. to date has allocated more than $164 million to
upgrade four naval and air bases in Oman. The Reagan administra-
tion will provide $78.5 million in FY 82 for the upgrading in
addition to the $85.5 million allocated by the Carter administra-
tion. The upgrading includes oil storage and fleet support
facilities, a desal inization plant, and improvements in the air-
fields to accommodate transports, fighters, and surveillance air-
craft. In sum, what exists is an agreement whereby the U.S. is
supplying arms (up to $800 million worth), upgrading military
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facilities (over $164 million), and providing economic aid ($90
million in concessionary loans) for "occasional" use of military
facilities. One would think that the U.S. could get much more
from such a vocal pro-Western Arab country such as Oman, but why
not?
One reason is that American officials, by and large, have
yery little experience in working closely with the governments of
the Arabian Peninsula or, for that matter, other governmental or
ethnic groups farther to the east. So far we have done a rather
poor job, with press releases which would make Lawrence of Arabia
rollover in his grave. Various leaks intended for home consumption
in the U.S. have come near to alienating Arab leaders, whose wish
is to have a strong but silent partner
.
The U.S. intentions toward obtaining base rights in Oman
definitely have some positive aspects; a pro-Western oriented
government and probably the best strategic location there is to
stage from for a large number of Southwestern Asia contingencies.
There are some negative aspects, however, which must be taken into
account before the U.S. invests more money into Oman only to be
denied facilities usage "ala Bandar Abbas or Chah Bahar."
If the U.S. supply of arms to Oman is one of the methods
used by the U.S. to ensure regional stability, what do other Arab
countries have to say? Using Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
vices (FBIS) extracts from January to June 1980 (the time frame
following the announcement of the U.S.-Omani agreement), the following
are some comments offered by some Arab Gulf states.
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Bahrain -- Bahrain has asserted that it will never provide
any military bases or facilities for any foreign state, "especially
the big powers." The Bahraini Foreign Minister emphasized "the de-
fense of the Gulf must be undertaken by the states of the area , and
any request by any foreign state for bases of facilities will be
rejected." The Foreign Minister added at a later date that
"there is no organization in the Gulf area that supports Oman's
steps to grant facilities or military bases in the area. The
act of bringing U.S. forces into the area would complicate
matters and would render the dangers of conflict and competition
between the U.S. and the USSR in the area more possible and
more serious.""^
Kuwait -- Both the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
have rejected the presence of American forces in the area. They ex-
press the belief that the region needs no protection because it is
capable of protecting itself. The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister has
called on the major powers to withdraw all their fleets and naval
forces from the Gulf region and neighboring areas "and to keep this
important strategic region of the world away from international
conflicts." He said that Kuwait has repeatedly declared "its dis-
approval to the inclusion of this region within the arena of world
conflicts and has stressed that it is against any military presence
in the area.
UAE -- The UAE rejects outside protection and states as such
in the following statement:
"It is true that the Arab Gulf states have condemned the Soviet
military intervention in Afghanistan. . .however, Iheir position
on Afghanistan was decided at the Islamic Conference. . .and their
awareness of the Soviet danger does not mean that they should
accept foreign forces. Just as they reject and condemn any Soviet
expansion, the Gulf States, on the basis of the same independent
national will, reject U.S. protection." 65
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Saudi Arabia — "The Saudi Information Minister has stressed
that there are no foreign military bases and that there never will
be any foreign military bases in Saudi Arabia. He asserted that
his country does not believe in pacts and blocs." The Saudis are
understood to be insisting that American efforts in Oman be limited
and discrete in order to avoid offending the majority of Arab
countries which object to an American military presence in the Arab
world as long as the U.S. continues to support Israel. Saudi views
are respected in Muscat as Saudi economic assistance is vital to
Oman. It is taken for granted that Saudi Arabia will pay for much
of the projected American and other Western military assistance to
Oman.
Iraq -- But it is Iraq which is most strongly pursuing
positive non-alignment. It condemned the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan but was equally as scathing about U.S. attempts to make
political capital out of the situation, and has called for an Arab
Charter banning the use of force in inter-Arab disputes and for-
fift
bidding the establishment of foreign bases on Arab soil. The
first article of the proposed charter states:
"The presence in the Arab homeland of any foreign troops or
military forces shall be rejected and no facilities for the
use of Arab territory shall be extended to them in any form
or under any pretext or cover. Any Arab regime that fails
to comply with this principle shall be proscribed and boy-
cotted both economically and politically as well as politically
opposed by all available means.
"
6 ^
Of course Libya could not pass up an opportunity for
anti-U.S. rhetoric and, immediately after the U.S.-Omani agree-
ment was finalized in June 1980, it was bitterly condemned by the
Arab People's Congress as being a concession to "U.S. imperialism."
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In addition to these negative reactions to Omani-U.S.
cooperation from external players, the PFLO also had some things
to say. When wind of a U.S.-Omani agreement reached the Voice of
the PFLO in Aden, it broadcast, "The opening by Qabus' Muscat
regime of Oman's doors to these foreigners, the enemies of the
people, so that they might establish military bases on the soil
of our country constitutes a grave threat to the freedom not only
of our Omani people, but of all the peoples of the region."
In light of the above negative view on U.S. arms for base
rights in Oman, should the U.S. be pushing this method for regional
security? I say no; but what are the alternatives? I think there
are two main alternative methods for Gulf security which the U.S.
should support; one is to support a regional defense organization
and the other is to advocate more Allied participation in arms
supply and the Western presence. The next two chapters focus on
these two alternative routes to Gulf security.
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IV. GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
The purpose of this chapter is to look at one possible solu-
tion to the Gulf security problem, the formation of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), which is considered by some to be one
of the most significant developments to take place in the Middle
East for many years. This chapter should provide one with an
understanding of the GCC, its background, the current issues, and
its future. It is hoped that one will realize that the GCC has
already assumed a leading role in Middle Eastern affairs and will
continue to be an important organization to be watched by any
serious student in the Middle East.
A. EVOLUTION
1 . Past Regional Organizations
The first regional international organization of any im-
portance which involved Persian Gulf states was the Saadabad
2
Entente, which consisted of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.
The Saadabad Pact was signed on 8 July 1937 at Shah Reza's Garden
Palace in the mountains near Tehran and provided for mutual coopera-
3
tion, consultations, and nonaggression among the signatories. The
Pact was additionally intended to act as a voting bloc in the
League of Nations and did not contain any obligations for collective
self-defense . Only three meetings of the Pact's Council (the Foreign
Ministers of each country) were held with nothing substantial
occurring as a result. Futile attempts were made by Turkey to
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revive the Pact following the outbreak of World War II. Nonetheless,
the Pact was never formally renounced in accordance with its de-
lineated procedures, and is thus technically still in force. As
late as 1972, Afghanistan considered it still in effect.
On 7 October 1944, in Alexandria, seven Arab states of the
Middle East (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and
Transjordan) signed a protocol in which they undertook, in the near
future, to establish an Arab League according to a set of accepted
principles. The protocol rejected earlier proposals for a full
union, providing instead for an association of soverign states, yet
it stressed Arab unity in terms likely to evoke popular approval.
On 22 March 1945, in Cairo, the seven Arab states signed the pact
of the Arab League born as the result of two influences: one was
British influence and the other was the desire for greater unity
5
and strength. A quite powerless organization, the decisions of
the League are binding only upon those members who vote for them.
Today the Arab League consists of 21 member nations in-
cluding all of the GCC members (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE). The purpose of the League is to seek
cooperation of member states in economic, cultural, social, and
health affairs, in communications, and in matters affecting nation-
ality. It embodies a guarantee of the sovereignty of each member
and a promise to respect the systems of government established in
other member states and to abstain from any interference in in-
ternal affairs of other member states. No collective security or
mutual defense articles were included in the initial pact. In
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1950, however, a loosely constructed security pact was accepted,
which stated that aggression against any one of the signatories
would be regarded as aggression against all. 7
Arab League actions in the Persian Gulf have been limited
by the fact that most Gulf states did not attain their independence
until 1971, that there has been almost constant hostility between
Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and that Persian Gulf security issues have
o
involved, in most cases, extra-regional actors. The League could
be considered a non-political success and could pride itself on
considerable accomplishments in the fields of technical and cul-
tural cooperation. The Arab League cannot, however, be regarded as a
dynamic vehicle of Arab unity. As far as the Gulf region is con-
cerned, the only political/security issue in which the Arab
League played a major role was the Kuwait-Iraq confrontation in
1961-63. 9
In April 1954 Turkey signed a pact of mutual cooperation
with Pakistan; a pact that was hailed as the nucleus for the
building of a defense line against the Soviet bloc. In February
1955, a subsequent treaty was signed with Iraq. This became the
basis for a regional alliance, to be known as the Baghdad Pact
(also known as the Middle East Treaty Organization, METO). In
April the United Kingdom signed; and later Pakistan and Iran be-
came the fourth and fifth members. Bri tains membership was of
momentous significance inasmuch as it introduced the first major
power into a pact hitherto linking medium or small states only.
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In August 1959 the name of the Baghdad Pact was changed to
the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and despite repeated
appeals from the members, the U.S. never signed the treaty itself,
and its closest legal connection remained in the form of three bi-
lateral executive agreements. The failure of the U.S. to join
CENTO was due partly to America's reluctance to burn the bridges in
her relations with Egypt and partly to the protests of Israel, who
attacked the Pact as hostile to herself. According to Ralph
Magnus, the fundamental reason for U.S. non-membership is that the
interests of the U.S., as stated in the Eisenhower Doctrine, require
only defense of threatened nations "against armed aggression from
any country controlled by international communism" and not general
1?defense cooperation as obligated by the CENTO treaty.
The regional members of CENTO had hoped, since its inception,
to use it as a vehicle to enhance their security against regional
threats. In this way it is a direct successor to the Saadabad
13
Pact. After the unfortunate experience of the Saadabad Pact in
facing the challenge of World War II, the regional members realized
that their only effective security against such a powerful neighbor
would require the cooperation of the other Great Powers, the U.S.
and the UK. The U.S. used to participate in the regular joint
military exercises carried out under CENTO, and CENTO, if it had
survived, could have been a valuable vehicle to counter Soviet
schemes of expansion in the region. In early 1979 Pakistan announced
its intention of withdrawing from CENTO, and Iran and Turkey issued
14
statements in agreement with Pakistan that CENTO should be dissolved.
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An awareness of past attempts at regional cooperation is
valuable and would be incomplete without some mention of past Arab
unity attempts, which are also germane to an understanding of the
GCC. The following is a listing of failed attempts at Arab unity:
1940's — Transjordan's King Abdullah's plan for the creation
of a Greater Syria.
1950's -- Iraqi Premier Nur Said's unified Fertile Crescent.
1958 -- Egypt and Syria form the United Arab Republic followed
shortly by the federation of Yemen to the UAR.
1961 -- Baathist coup in Syria led to Syria's withdrawal from
UAR.
1963 -- An Egypt, Syria, and Iraq federation proposed but
never materialized.
1964 -- Joint Egypt-Iraq military command set up but it
collapsed.
1969 -- Tentative unity experiment launched between Qadhafi
in Libya and Egypt; led to the federation of Arab
Republics in 1971
.
1970 -- The death of Gamal Abdul Nasser was a serious setback
for attempts to bring Arabs together.
1972 -- Total union declared between Egypt and Libya but
Sadat's drift to the West halted any progress. After
the Qadhafi "March of the 40,000" to the border with
Egypt in 1973, Sadat reacted against being pressured
and the union collapsed.
1974 -- Qadhafi 's "unity with anyone" trail when he declared
union with Tunisia; the Tunisians (quite surprised)
hastily withdrew.
1980 -- Libya and Syrian declared union, but it is still in-
conclusive, foundering, and virtually nonexistent.
1980 -- Following its intervention in Chad, Libya declared
that the two states would become one. Chad is yery
reluctant to implement the union amidst major
opposition from the 0AU as well as from other Arab,
Western, and African states.' 5
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The foregoing review hopefully reveals that the record of the Arab
movement for unification is replete with many gradiose schemes and
solemn agreements but it is also punctuated with as many failures.
Profound differences between cultural and social levels, discrepan-
cies in economic wealth, and contrasts in ideologies and political
structures among Arab states largely accounted for the failures to
achieve the desired unity.
The Gulf Cooperation Council seems to be the latest attempt
at Arab unity (even though it is not being advertised as such).
Enthusiastic supporters of the GCC have described the states as
being already 90 percent of the way to unity, and argue that once
unity is achieved in the Gulf, it will rapidly encompass the Red
Sea and the rest of the Arab world, and ultimately the whole Islamic
world. The lesson seems to have been learned that unions based on
ideology are fore-doomed to failure, especially since the Arab states
have now been established long enough to have developed formidable
domestic power centers which are reluctant to relinquish a power
for which they have, in some cases, struggled for many years. In
this respect, the GCC appears to have a better chance of success
than other attempts at unity, since it has steered clear of con-
tentious political and religious divisions, and is building a firm
economic base first.
2. Gulf Security Plans
The GCC as it exists today has evolved over several years
via several intermediate joint bodies. The Gulf area itself is
unique in that it is already more integrated than many federated
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states at both the official and popular levels. Indeed, the Gulf
can already claim the only unity experiment ever to have endured
in the Arab world, the United Arab Emirates. There was already
considerable cooperation in various spheres which arose from the
realization that many problems could be tackled more efficiently
in this way. Regular meetings were held, for example, by Trade,
Information, Industry, and Agriculture Ministries. Joint bodies
have also been set up like the Arab Gulf News Agency, Gulf Televi-
sion, Arab Gulf Labor Organization, and the Gulf Organization for
Industrial Consulting. Moreover, in October 1980, a joint project
was announced for cooperation between Interior Ministries over
security matters, traffic, passports, and immigration. The
thorniest issue, second only to political coordination, is coopera-
tion over military and security matters. Several Gulf security
projects have been put forward since the mid-1970's but all have
foundered on the rocks of individual interests and mutual
suspicion.
One of the first security plans was proposed by Iran in
1975 but nothing substantial was ever agreed upon by the other
Persian Gulf states. At Muscat, Oman in 1976, specific designs
for a regional security organization were again discussed, but no
agreement could be reached. Between 1976 and 1979 there were no
further substantive security plans tabled. Following the 1979
Shi i te revolution in Iran, separate plans for the security of the
Arab Gulf were produced by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman,
leaving only the three small Emirates not to have produced
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blueprints. On top of this, the regional rulers were offered a
Gulf Security Pact to consider by Soviet President Brezhnev in
December 1980. 18
In September 1979 Iraq offered to send troops to Kuwait and
Bahrain in the event of internal or external threats to the
Emirates. This offer emerged as part of an Iraqi plan for general
security of the whole Gulf region in that its troops would be part
of an Arab Deterrent Force. The main elements of the Iraqi plan
were:
"The conclusion of a collective security and mutual defense
agreement to complement the Arab League Defense Pact for the
seven Arab Gulf states. The creation of a collective Deterrent
force under joint military command with a budget separate from
those of the armies of the individual states. The creation of
a collective Defense force to be considered as an integral part
of a Gulf Defense Agreement. Personnel and Financial contribu-
tions to the collective defense of the Gulf would be made by
individual member states on the basis of their relative wealth
and military strength. "'9
In 1979 Oman too proposed a plan of a very different kind
for the protection of the Gulf. Oman's primary concern was with
the protection of the Strait of Hormuz. The plan envisaged the
spending of some $100 million and called for a major role to be
given to the Western Powers in carrying it out (namely the U.S.,
the UK, and West Germany). It suggested the setting up of air
reconnaissance patrols, electronic monitoring equipment on both
sides of the Hormuz waterway, and a fleet of barges and Gulf patrol
ships. The plan had no provisions for the political security of
the Arab Gulf states (like the Iraqi Deterrent Force). Allied to
the plan was the long-cherished Omani scheme to charge a transit
fee to ships using the Strait, in line with Suez Canal transit
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charges, but cheaper. Iraq advised against the transit fee and
rejected the security plan outright.
At a conference of the Gulf Foreign Ministers in Taif Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait proposed a plan similar to the Iraqi one with the
important concept added of an "Arab Interpol" to coordinate con-
trols against internal security threats. It also included new
details for oil field defense and a unique "Religious Interpol"
which would monitor religious gatherings, mosques, and potentially
dissident Islamic sects. By September 1980, there were reports
that Kuwait was already quietly implementing some of their plan's
provisions.
In December 1980 the Saudis unveiled their "collective
security plan" which consisted of five principles forming the basis
of mutual security.
1. Collective Arab security is based on the security at home of
individual Arab states. If the internal security of one
state is endangered, the security of all is threatened.
2. Collective security is attained if all Arab states respond
to an individual state's plea for help against local and
imported threats and if they stop entry of international
criminals to Arab states.
3. The strengthening of cooperation among the police forces of
the various Arab states is essential.
4. Saudi Arabia considers that any harm done to the security
of one state will affect the collective security of all and,
consequently, urges cooperation to establish collective Arab
security and deny international criminals and saboteurs
access to the Arab society or refuge in Arab countries.
5. Saudi Arabia is willing to cooperate with other Arab, states
to combat crime and maintain security and stability.
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Also in December 1980 President Brezhnev presented a five
point program which sought commitments from the U.S., other Western
powers, China, Japan, and all other interested states to:
1. Not establish foreign military bases in the Persian Gulf,
nor deploy nuclear weapons in the region.
2. Not employ or threaten force against the nations of the region
and not interfere in their internal affairs.
3. Respect the nonaligned status chosen by governments of the
region; and not draw them into military alliances.
4. Respect the sovereign rights of the states in the region to
their natural resources.
5. Not raise any obstacles or threats to normal commerce or to
the use of sea lanes linking the Gulf states with the other
countries of the world.
These proposals did not sit well with the Gulf states who considered
that the superpowers, by enacting these proposals, were preparing to
sub-divide the area into spheres of influence in a return to colonial
imperialism. The Soviet leader's proposals were by and large a
propaganda move designed to enhance the USSR's role in the region.
Realizing the obvious disparity among the several plans and
the problems involved in obtaining unanimous agreement, the Gulf
states temporarily shelved their collective security plans and
instead chose to start with simpler cooperation initiatives.
A discussion of nascent Gulf security plans cannot end
without some mention of the involvement of the West. After the
years of withdrawal from Gulf affairs by the UK, France, and the
U.S., it appears that the Western powers are having second thoughts
about their role in the area. With the advent of the Reagan
administration and strong statements from the White House about
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the necessity for a "visible presence" in the Middle East and a
clampdown on "terrorist" regimes, the indications are that the Gulf
states will not have an entirely free hand in the development of
their security plans. Moreover, there is a tacit (yet silent)
acknowledgement of this in the Gulf where, despite calls for the
superpowers to keep out of the region's affairs, some states (Oman
for one) still want to feel the power of Western guarantees behind
them. However, one Gulf expert says that the GCC was designed to
confront Western pressure for bases through a common front that
would both reassure the West that adequate regional measures were
underway and prevent Oman's negotiations with the U.S. from going
24
too far. It is this writer's contention that the West does have
a role to play in Gulf security but they should be patient and
discrete and wait for the opportune time. The GCC is still in an
evolutionary stage; and now is the time to look at it more closely.
B. STRUCTURE
On 4 February 1981 at a meeting in Riyadh of the Foreign
Ministers of the six GCC countries, a proposal calling for the
25
creation of a cooperation committee was approved. Gulf officials
declared at that time that the GCC will try to mold its member
states into a group similar to the European Economic Community
(EEC). They would bind their economies together following the EEC
principle that merging economic interests could end old rivalries
and ensure effective political cooperation. On 14 February 1981 a
statement was issued in Riyadh that indicated that the Coordination
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Council would include two councils and a general secretariat. The
statement said that the Higher Council, formed of the Heads of
State, would meet twice yearly and will have its headquarters at
Riyadh. On 10 March 1981, at the end of a two-day conference in
Muscat Oman, the six Foreign Ministers signed the draft constitu-
tion of the GCC and agreed on almost all of the details for the
creation of the Council. The final approval of the constitution
occurred at the first summit of the GCC in Abu Dhabi on 25 May 1981. 27
(The texts of the document establishing the GCC and the GCC constitution
are contained in Appendix B).
C. SECRETARY-GENERAL
In addition to the formal inauguration of the GCC at the Abu Dhabi
meeting, the Secretary-General of the Council was chosen to be the
former Kuwaiti .Ambassador to the UN, Abdullah Yacoub Bishara. He is
a Gulf official with an abundance of experience in Gulf cooperation
matters. In the early 1970' s, he had taken part in talks for the
setting up of a defense alliance following British withdrawal from
Aden. He also participated in the setting up of the federation which
was later to become the United Arab Emirates. He has represented
Kuwait at the UN for 10 years, including two as its representative
in the Security Council. Of interest, it was at Bishara' s New York
residence that the U.S. UN representative Andrew Young met with PLO
28
representative Zehdi Terzi . Bishara' s selection was considered a
political master stroke as a means of enhancing the prospects for
greater Kuwaiti moderation of foreign policy matters, as well as
encouraging greater involvement of considerable Kuwaiti experience
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and expertise in GCC activities, than might otherwise have been
29
the case.
When Bishara was first appointed his comment was, "The baby
is just born. There are no teeth to it." 30 He explained that in
the beginning the Council will try to lay down the basis of future
activity on general consensus and collective work. For the imple-
mentation of such a collective approach he said it would take more
than two to three years. In July 1981 the Secretary-General gave
an interview in which he voiced opinions on various issues. The
following are some of the more noteworthy excerpts from this
... 31interview:
Relations with the U.S. -- "The way the U.S. has treated the
Arabs is insulting. We are being taken for a ride and we be-
lieve that the best answer to this would be a common Arab
policy based on solidarity.
. .we do not see any real hope of
improvement in the relationship between the U.S. and the Arab
world."
The Rapid Deployment Force -- "We believe that the RDF of the
U.S. would directly or indirectly invite the intervention of
the Soviet Union to find footholds in the area... we want no
military offers from the Western bloc or Eastern bloc. In
other words the security of the Gulf should be left to the
people of the Gulf alone."
On Future Relations with Moscow -- "It would be foolhardy to
say that the relations between the Soviet Union and the Gulf
states will remain as they are. They may develop, they may
differ, but I definitely do not rule out any possibility."
These statements are not overflowing with pro-Western sentiment nor
do they portend optimistic U.S. -GCC relations. These statements,
however, do not tell the whole story. As previously mentioned,
the GCC is evolving and the best way to ascertain the direction it
is moving is to review the central concerns of the GCC and to see what




A variety of economic linkages connect the Arab states of the
Gulf not only with each other, but also with other Arab states of
the Middle East. Although these links are rudimentary, there is
growing recognition that the future development prospects for in-
dividual states depend on increasing and diversifying economic
flows. The links which have grown most rapidly since the early
1970' s involve labor flows, financial flows, direct investments,
joint business ventures, and the construction of communications,
transportation, and other infrastructure facilities. 32 Any multi-
lateral institutions which had been set up to coordinate these
type of economic flows will now be absorbed under the aegis of the
GCC. Committees will be (and in some cases already have been) set
up to consider the unification of economic laws, the issuing of ID
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cards, and even the diversification of arms sources.
1 . Labor
Perhaps one of the most disturbing economic issues con-
fronting the Council is the inter-Arab labor migration problem.
Labor flows from the non-oil Arab countries to the Gulf generate
reverse financial flows when the laborers involved repatriate
their earnings. In addition to remittances, such workers also
bring back higher levels of human capital based on the experience
and knowledge gained in foreign jobs. In certain Gulf states,
aliens outnumber the native population (see Table 1).
A number of multilateral steps have been taken to facilitate





NATIONAL AND NON-NATIONAL POPULATIONS OF THE CAPITAL-RICH
GULF STATES (1975)
Country Nationals I Non -Nationals I
Kuwait 472,100 48.4 502,500 51.6
Qatar 67,900 41.2 97,000 58.8
UAE 200,000 41.0 456,000 59.0
Bahrain 214,000 79.3 56,000 20.7
S. Arabia 4,592,500 74.6 1 ,565,000 25.4
basis. The Arab Economic Unity Council (AEUC) has undertaken a
study which projects labor requirements for all categories in the
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Gulf for the period 1976-86. In the medium term, manpower
shortages are likely to become a real constraint upon development
in both capital-rich and labor-supplying nations. In late
April 1982, the GCC Immigration, Passports, and Labor Committee of
Directors decided to standardize all regulations adopted by GCC
member states for immigration, passports, residence, labor, and
naturalization. The committee also decided to take measures to
furnish the GCC citizens with all facilities to guarantee the
freedom of labor, residence, and travel among the GCC member
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states. This should facilitate an equitable flow of labor
throughout the Gulf. The Gulf states depend on foreign labor at
all levels and especially at the lower levels in public works and
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industry. In addition to being an economic problem, expatriate
labor also can precipitate political problems thereby constituting




Until the early 1970' s, most Gulf countries had direct
telephone links with European countries but not with each other.
Since then a considerable amount of oil money has been spent to
develop communications facilities within the Gulf. Gulf Air
(jointly owned by four Gulf states) is a true pan-Arab airline and
sets an example for other Arab airline mergers. Moreover, other
regional infrastructure plans are being considered including a
Bahrain-Saudi Arabia causeway, a Kuwait-Saudi Arabia-Qatar-UAE rail-
way, and a Saudi-Arabia-UAE road. As the infrastructure in the
region develops, interstate economic relations become more conducive
and could subsequently strengthen GCC ties.
3. Investment and Joint Ventures
The Gulf oil producers have established a variety of profit-
oriented investment companies, some of which are multilateral, to
finance investments in the region. Two successful examples include
the Arab Investment Company and the Gulf International Bank. Joint
ventures by the governments have also been a vehicle for regional
cooperation. There are such ventures as the Arab Shipbuilding and
Repair Yard, the Arab Marine Petroleum and Transport Company, the
Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation, the Arab Company for Mining,
the Arab Company for the Development of Livestock Resources, and
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the Gulf Pharmaceuticals Industries. A takeover of these joint
ventures by a GCC committee would solve the problem of scarcity of
experienced managers in the region and also facilitate better
management of a heterogenous portfolio of investments. Of note,
71

$six billion has been set aside as an investment fund and an
arbitration agency has been established to settle any disputes
among GCC members.
4. Regional Development Assistance
The Gulf oil producers have extended a considerable amount
of concessional and non-concessional financial assistance to other
Arab countries in the region. Such help has been provided through
a variety of bilateral and multilateral channels. There was the
Gulf Organization for Development in Egypt which was set up by
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE in 1976. There was also
the national development agencies such as the Kuwait Fund for Arab
Economic Development, the Saudi Development Fund, and the Abu Dhabi
Fund for Arab Economic Development. The Arab Economic Unity Council
established an Arab Conciliation Board to mediate in disputes aris-
ing between host countries, public organizations, and investors
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from other Arab states. It is here where a collective GCC com-
mittee could be installed to add uniformity to development laws and
policies.
5. Monetary Linkages
Two attempts have been made to deal with monetary policies
in the area. The first was the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) which
became operational in 1977. The second was the attempt by several
countries to integrate their monetary systems and adopt a unified
4?
currency. The AMF could serve a useful function by laying the
intellectual groundwork necessary to move the region toward greater
monetary integration. Regarding the unified currency, it is more
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likely that one or two strong Arab Gulf currencies will come to
dominate. A previously proposed Gulf currency union suffered a
setback in 1979 when Qatar unilaterally revalued its currency.
It is this type of unilateral monetary policy that the Gulf
Council will have to dissuade. It is significant to note that
one of the EEC's goals was a common currency; however, it has yet
to evolve although the EEC has been at it for years. A Gulf
common currency is feasible but it will take time.
6. Industrial Integration
The mid-1970's oil revenues surge led Gulf governments to
adopt ambitious industrialization programs. The limited avail-
ability of manpower and management resources, however, restricts
the number of investments a single government can make. Even
though manpower and management can be imported there are a limited
number of government officials capable of overseeing these type
projects. To date, political conflicts and economic rivalries
have limited cooperation. The GCC will slowly alleviate these
barriers and through coordination will provide the greatest chance
for expanding the economic links in the Gulf. John Duke Anthony
has stated that a budding consensus among the GCC's technically-
oriented development planners and economists is that the way for
the GCC to proceed is via achieving gradual economic cooperation.
If successful, the accomplishments in this area should point at





As previously mentioned, prior to the existence of the GCC
several member states had plans for the security of the Gulf.
Once the GCC was on the track of cooperation in economic ventures,
the security issue again surfaced. The clearest message now emerg-
ing from the Council members is that "defense of the Gulf is the
exclusive responsibility of Gulf nations." It was the alarm
engendered by the prospect of superpower confrontation that finally
moved the Gulf states to disregard their rivalries and to search
for the means to collective security. After Khomeini and the Gulf
war, the choice was clear; either defend themselves, or to wash
their hands of the whole Gulf problem and let the big powers return
to fight over the area in a new type of colonial domination.
1 . Defense Problems
Apart from the obvious lack of depth in existing GCC de-
fenses, there are three other basic weaknesses. The most serious
weakness is the shortage of manpower and equipment to secure the
defense of the \fery vulnerable Gulf coastal area and to provide
any significant reserve. The U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) is
currently the only possible source of reinforcement on the scale
required. The second major weakness relates to Iraq's continuing
war with Iran. The better-than-expected performance by Iranian
forces has caused several setbacks to the Iraqis. Such setbacks
greatly increase the threat to the GCC's northern flank. Infil-
tration across the Gulf from Iran is likely to increase bringing
with it an increased threat of subversion in the Gulf states. The
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third major weakness in the GCC's defensive posture is that both
northern and southern flanks are vulnerable. The northern one can
be secured by an Iraqi victory but, in the longer term, only a
linking of the GCC defenses with those of Iraq and a further exten-
sion to link with NATO defenses in Turkey is likely to prove
adequate security for this flank. The security of the southern
flank poses equally serious problems in the absence of adequate
ground and air forces to secure control of the vital Strait of
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Hormuz. Let us now turn to see what the GCC has done to shore up
its defenses.
2. Defense Resolutions
In late January 1982, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan
said that the Defense Ministers of the six GCC states made "unanimous
secret resolutions" on establishing a collective protective force for
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the Gulf. The resolutions are reported to contain the following
points:
-- Use a AWACS to patrol whole of Gulf in conjunction with joint
air defense umbrella.
-- Establishment of a joint rapid deployment force comprising the
armed forces of all GCC states.
-- Establishment of a joint $1.4 billion military industries
organization.
-- Coordination of all future arms purchases of GCC states.
GCC Secretary-General Bishara was quoted as saying for his part
that collective security "will not leave any gaps for the big
47
powers and foreign countries to infiltrate the region."
As a prelude to the establishment of a collective security
force in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is signing bilateral military
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agreements with each of the other GCC members. 48 As of June,
Kuwait was the only GCC member which has failed to sign a security
accord with the Saudis. It seems Kuwait is wary of Saudi military
dominance within the GCC and is dragging its feet. 49 Nonetheless,
there is a so-called Riyadh timetable for the GCC collective defense
agreement.
1. Bilateral security agreements with each GCC state no later
than the middle of 1982.
2. A bilateral defense pact between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
before November 1982, so that bilateral defense accords are
signed by other GCC states before the end of 1982.
3. A collective security pact would be finalized by the GCC
summit in November.
4. A collective defense agreement would be drafted by the end
of 1982 but could be delayed until the middle of 1983. 50
F. FOREIGN RELATIONS
In addition to the GCC member collective security arrangements,
there are also wider security arrangements in the offing with other
Arab and non-Arab states providing varying degrees of support. It
is in the context of looking at the Council's foreign relations
where we find more support for the GCC. It is perhaps best to
structure this discussion on a country by country basis with the
order of presentation being no reflection of relative priority.
Pakistan -- Pakistan's links with Saudi Arabia and the Arabian
Gulf states go back to the earliest days of British association
with the Gulf when British interests there were directed from India.
Now Pakistan is being groomed for a key defense role in a wide
regional strategy under U.S. military directives and Saudi
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diplomatic and financial guidance. Pakistan is concerned for the
security of its Islamic ally, its oil supplies, and its major source
of financial aid and foreign currency earnings; Saudi Arabia. A
number of Pakistani airmen and soldiers have enlisted in the armed
services of the GCC states (now mainly in Oman where Pakistani
workers and contractors are also playing a major part in development
projects). Additionally, a special division of Pakistani troops
have been assigned to reinforce Saudi forces in the event of either
an internal uprising or external threat. In the Saudi view, Pakistan,
with its own vital interest in Gulf security, its common Islamic
heritage, its current regime being equally as hostile to religious
extremism as the GCC states are, and its deep suspicions of Soviet
long-term intentions in Afghanistan, has a vital role to play in the
defense of the Gulf.
Turkey -- Turkey's geographical position gives it both a vital
role in NATO and a strategic position on the western periphery of
the Middle East. It is probable that Ankara would willingly allow
Turkey to become involved in any U.S. action in the region. The
governments of the GCC states are particularly anxious to avoid the
risk of turmoil in the strategically sensitive area linking the oil
producing states with their major market in the West. Therefore,
it was not unusual that Greek-Turkish tension was among the main
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topics discussed at a GCC Foreign Minister's meeting. There are
some 120,000 Turks believed to be working in the Gulf and an esti-
mated 40 percent of Turkish exports during 1981 were consigned to
Gulf states. The loss of Turkey's manpower and industrial and
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agricultural potential would be a severe blow to a group of states
anxious to reduce their dependence on the West. Although no formal
ties have yet been forged between Turkey and the GCC, there is
general awareness that, within the Middle East region, their defense
interests are almost identical. A strong and stable Turkey securely
established within NATO and possibly the EEC would leave it free and
well -placed to provide much needed security for the threatened
northern flank of the GCC's area of interest.
Jordan -- According to a report in Al Nahar Arab and International,
the formation of a Jordanian volunteers' corps to take part in the
war against Iran alongside Iraqi forces constitutes the "embodiment"
of King Hussein's interest in participating in the political stabil-
53ization of the Gulf states. In addition, the report said that
during King Hussein's visit to Washington (November 1981) the U.S.
leaders called for bolstering the role of the Jordanian army in
connection with Gulf state stability. The Jordanian military
assistance to Iraq is part of a Saudi Arabia-Morocco-Jordan tripartite
policy, the main target of which is to put an end to the Iran-Iraq
war and reduce the pressures faced by the Palestinian resistance
in Lebanon. The participation of the U.S. in the tripartite
policy is reflected in: the Saudi decision to form a joint com-
mittee with the U.S., the U.S. to supply Jordan with weapons, and
the visit paid by U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Veliotes to
54
Morocco. Jordan also plays a role in the Gulf by supplying
intelligence support to several Gulf states (including Oman).
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Egypt -- There have been several statements and speculations on
the possibility of reintegration of Egypt into the Arab fold. On
26 March 1982, Arab League Secretrary-General Chedli Klibi declared
that "we are looking forward to Egypt's return." This was the
first time such a declaration was made by the Arab League Secretary
since the Arab League pulled out of Egypt. Egypt, with its power-
ful military, would be a welcome ally to the GCC. In April and May
1982 favorable statements about Egypt and its crucial Arab role
abounded, with Egypt's return to the Arab fold considered to be only
56
a matter of time. Oman, which already maintains relations with
Egypt, is acting as a go-between. Sultan Qabus visited Egypt in
May and in a toast to Egyptian President Mubarak he called on the
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Arab world to forget the past and to restore relations with Egypt.
The drive to return Egypt to the Arab fold has gathered momentum
since Israel evacuated the Sinai in late April. Only the radical
Arab states of South Yemen, Syria, and Libya and the PLO still demand
Egypt break ties with Israel before any reconciliation.
With Egypt likely to be invited back to the Arab camp, Egyptian
Defense Minister Abu Ghazala has called for the formation of a
pan-Arab military force. The proposed force, according to the De-
fense Minister, could be funded by a levy of a one dollar tax on
every barrel of oil sold by Arab Gulf states. Abu Ghazala's pro-
posal comes at a time when Egypt is once again asserting its onetime
leadership role in the Arab world. In April, Egypt reportedly con-
cluded a $2.5 billion agreement for the supply of military equipment




invited to join the GCC. If Egypt does accept the invitation,
GCC collective security plans will be greatly enhanced as will
Egypt's role in the Arab world.
Morocco -- Moroccan ties with Saudi Arabia have developed sig-
nificantly within the past year. Saudi Arabia is funding Morocco's
increasing arms purchases from the U.S. American strategists are
reported to believe that an early and favorable end to the seven-
year war with the guerrillas in Western Sahara would leave Morocco
free to release more of its French-trained and battle-hardened mili-
tary manpower to the GCC states. Some thousands of trained Moroccan
and Tunisian personnel are reported to be serving in various sectors,
including the armed forces, of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and
Qatar. In February, Riyadh and Rabat signed an internal security
agreement. The large measure of identity between the Moroccan armed
services equipment and the equipment holdings of Saudi Arabia and
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other GCC states greatly eases the problem of integration.
Tunisia -- Tunisia, with a higher standard of living and a
strongly pro-Western tradition, is well placed to provide middle
and senior management over a wide variety of activities. Tunisia's
armed forces, which recently received a reported $85 million U.S.
military aid package, are already largely equipped with U.S. arma-
ments. With a 12 month selective service system, Tunisia has a
useful capacity to provide trained military personnel to strengthen
the overstretched resources of the GCC states. Tunisia and Qatar
signed a military and technical cooperation agreement in early
March and this appears to be yet another move in the opening phases
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of a program to link the smaller GCC states with a North African
source of manpower. Tunisian volunteers have also been reported
arriving in Iraq to join the growing force fighting alongside the
. . 60
Iraqi army.
Algeria -- Algeria's record in maintaining hardline attitudes
on Arab-Israeli affairs, its membership in the Steadfastness and
Confrontation Front, and its continuing association with the USSR
would in the short term tend to limit Algerian provision of manpower
to GCC states like the other North African states. On the other
hand, GCC experts add, Algeria's increasing dependence on French
and other Western markets for its oil exports and improving rela-
tions with the U.S. suggest that in time Algerian manpower re-
sources could be of considerable significance in helping to meet
the GCC's medium and longer term needs.
Iraq -- Reportedly, Iraq is being briefed on Gulf collective
security by Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Riyadh is said to be
cultivating Baghdad's gradual overtures to the U.S. and other
Western powers. It is not yet clear whether the Saudi -Iraqi
briefings on Gulf security would ultimately lead to Baghdad's
membership in the GCC. However, just as the Arab Gulf states do
not want to be drawn into superpower disputes by joining superpower-
linked alliances, they do not want to join and exacerbate each
fil
other's quarrels. Iraqi membership in the GCC would most
certainly precipitate Iranian action against the GCC. Meanwhile,
the major part of the GCC's Foreign Minister's meeting held in
Kuwait on 15 May 1982 was devoted to discussing the Iran-Iraq
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military conflict and its possible political and security repercus-
sions. The GCC wants more Arab contribution to the efforts to
settle the conflict. There are several indications that there will
be a call for collective Arab efforts to settle the conflict
peacefully, in order to prevent foreign intervention in the affairs
CO
of the Gulf region as a result of the continuation of the war.
Another report reveals that there are differing opinions among the
GCC Foreign Ministers regarding the threat from the war; some view
the threat as imminent while others suggest taking more time to
face the situation and contain the threat. Obviously, the Iran-
Iraq war will continue to be of paramount importance to GCC
decision-makers.
North Yemen -- In early May, Secretary-General Bishara briefed
North Yemeni President Sal in on the Arab situation, the situation
in the region and the Gulf, and the GCC's way of handling issues
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facing the region. This type of interaction is judged to be a
first step toward the possibility of an invitation to join the GCC
some time in the future. What the GCC would like to see would be
unity in the Yemens; however, this seems to be well over the hori-
zon. In the interim, cordial dealings with North Yemen are in the
GCC's interest to help maintain stability on the Peninsula.
France -- The election of the socialist, pro-Israel Francois
Mitterand in France has seemed to put the future of France's in-
volvement with the Arabs, and therefore the Gulf states, seriously
at risk. In late May Saudi state radio commentary indicated that
Mitterand's visits to Israel and the U.S., and Zaire's decision to
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reestablish relations with Israel (after French urging) have cast
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shadows of suspicion on Arab-French relations. However, the
French have been involved in several deals with the Gulf region
including increased sales of armaments and industrial products to
the GCC states. In December 1981, French Defense Minister, Charles
Henru, signed a $3.4 billion contract to modernize and expand the
Saudi Navy and its base facilities. France's expressed willingness
to take an equity stake in the proposed Gulf Armaments industry has
fifi
done much to improve its position. Additionally, the growing
French-trained North African military element in Gulf defenses
should undoubtedly strengthen France's position.
United Kingdom -- Early in 1980 then British Foreign Secretary
Lord Carrington said that Britain was prepared to put a Royal Navy
presence east of the Suez again. Baghdad's Al Thawra said this was
a pretext covering a planned British return to the Gulf. Now
almost self sufficient with North Sea oil, Britain's interest in
Gulf oil is not of the same magnitude of France or the U.S. None-
theless, the UK intends to keep a finger in the Middle East pie and
will not be denied its due role by the U.S. or its old rival France.
The UK is the dominant supplier of arms to the Gulf region; however,
it is too early to predict what effects the conflict with Argentina
will have on Britain's Middle East future.
Soviet Union -- According to a Kuwait political source, Syrian
Foreign Minister Khaddam reportedly has proposed a Gulf-Soviet
treaty to the GCC states when he visited in mid-January. There
have also been Saudi declarations on the eventuality of establishing
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diplomatic relations with the USSR (always mentioning Afghanistan
as one obstacle). Kuwait is the only Arab Gulf state which has
diplomatic relations with the Soviets and it has been calling for
the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and other
CO
Gulf states. It is certainly too early to tell which way Gulf-
Soviet relations will go and there is only GCC Secretary-General
Bishara's comment of not ruling out any possibility, to go by.
United States -- None of the Gulf states can, for both domestic
and inter-Arab political reasons, seem to be too close to the U.S.
The GCC, therefore, will have to agree on some type of ground
rules of cooperation with the U.S. for its public consumption.
It is conceivable that in the event of a direct threat from
the USSR, the Gulf rulers would welcome U.S. troops on their terri-
tories. But the rulers of these states do not see Soviet forces
as the real immediate threat (therefore there is no strategic con-
sensus). Their primary concern is with regional instability and
internal revolt which are seen as the imminent dangers. In con-
fronting these threats, Western troops are the last thing the
rulers want; such forces would tend to exacerbate any conflict
stemming from Islamic dissent. Hence the reluctance displayed by
almost all the conservative Arab states to discuss U.S. requests
for bases; domestic populations just will not accept Western
"infidel" troops.
To develop this point further, there is an interesting con-
trast in this aspect between the Omanis and their partners in
the GCC (and is one of the reasons the U.S. has received base
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access in Oman). Oman tends to favor a big role for the West, in
the belief that only the West can provide expert security rapidly.
It appears that the Saudi and Emirate fears of a Western presence
arousing the wrath of the population are based on what happened in
Iran to the Shah. But the Omanis have had the experience of the
highly efficient crushing of their internal revolt by the British
Army and Air Force. Qabus perceives the UK presence as having been
good for his regime and internal stability, the others see the
former U.S. presence in Iran as having driven the fatal wedge between
Shah and people.
It appears, therefore, that if GCC defense plans are perceived
as inadequate by Gulf rulers, there will then be a recognition of
the necessity to have a U.S. RDF intervention capability. Although
the GCC rulers will state and restate their basic opposition to for-
eign bases, until they see the fruition of their Gulf security
measures, they must silently accept the need to provide whatever is
necessary to facilitate rapid intervention by the RDF. It is on
this thin thread of acceptance that U.S. policy has been hanging.
It is this writer's contention that U.S. policy must shift away
from this thin thread toward a more substantial foundation. There-
fore, a more firm policy directed toward assisting the GCC in its
security plans is called for.
The foregoing summary of GCC foreign relations was in no way
intended to be all-encompassing. It was intended to provide some
of the more salient relationships between some of the more important
actors and the GCC states. The evolutionary status of the GCC and
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its relations with other countries tends to make the foregoing
summary somewhat perishable; however, it is a framework upon which
one can build as new events unfold.
G. RELIGIOUS ISSUES
As mentioned earlier, the GCC states are ruled by Sunni Muslims
(save for Oman) and as such they are emerging as the front-line if
a Sunni -Shi ite confrontation develops. The GCC will function as a
nucleus for Sunni regimes in confronting Shi ite militancy. What is
evolving is a Shi ite Alignment, with the Iranian regime playing a
central role, backed by Syria, Libya, South Yemen, Ethiopia and
other pro-Soviet states sympathetic to the Khomeini movement; and
a Sunni Alignment with Saudi Arabia assuming the leading role,
backed by the GCC, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and most other
Sunni-led regimes (as well as the U.S.).
This development could bring the Cold War to the Arabian
Peninsula with the U.S. backing the Sunni governments and the
Soviets the Shiites. This could also produce an ironical situation
Israel is attempting to infiltrate the Shi ite alignment and could
find itself confronting the U.S. Rather than opposing each other
in this type of conflict, both the U.S. and Israel might seek
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only to benefit from divisions arising within the Arab world.
Any discussion of the GCC would be incomplete without some mention
of the above potential religious confrontation and it behooves the
Gulf analyst to be aware of this volatile aspect of Gulf politics.
It is the aim of the next section to reveal some more GCC problems
by looking at the anti-GCC groupings.
86

H. COUNTER GCC MOVEMENTS
1 . Aden Alliance
Some political scientists ascribe to the belief that the
physical law which states that "for every action there is an equal
and opposite reaction," transfers easily to the political scene.
Those who hold such a view have a prime example to support it in
the late 1981 formation of a leftist treaty alliance by radical
Middle Eastern states in Aden. In August 1981 the Heads of State
from South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Libya signed a regional treaty of
friendship and cooperation. Two of these three countries already
have a similar treaty with the USSR. The new group, referred to
as the Aden Alliance, is, according to Yemeni leader Ali Nasser
Mohammad, taking action against all forms of conspiracy and
aggression which threatens the area, meaning of course U.S. influence.
The Aden Pact, as it is called, is divided into three sec-
tions; military, political, and economic and has some 28 clauses.
All of the clauses are included in Appendix C, but some of the more
significant ones are as follows:
-- Struggle against the Camp David agreement.
-- Provide active support for liberation movements especially
those in Somalia, North Yemen, Oman and Egypt.
-- Oppose the reactionary security, military, and political
blocs in the African and Arab regions (The GCC is considered
to be targetted in this provision).
-- Sign a mutual defense pact to ensure military and security
coordination between the three states.
One of the most significant quotations from the text is that "Any
aggression against one of the three signatories will be considered
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as an attack against the other two countries and they will defend
the country under attack by all possible means."
The interesting question, still unanswered, is whether the
Aden Alliance was planned in Moscow or Tripoli. The three countries
certainly have close relations with Moscow and the alliance has been
welcomed by the Soviets. Some reports suggest that efforts to bring
Syria, Algeria, and the PLO to the Aden summit failed. If Moscow
set it up, then the pact will almost certainly be used as a cover to
increase Soviet military strength in the region. Whether the Aden
Alliance is a Libyan or Soviet brainchild does not, however, add or
detract from the fact that it does exist and is an anti-GCC reaction
that the GCC will have to deal with.
2. Shi i te Marxist Coalition
The formation of a parallel alliance is also being sought
by various Shi i te and Communist militant organizations of the Gulf.
Nine Marxist and Shiite Militant organizations have agreed to hold
a regional congress to discuss a unified action against a new wave
of repression anticipated from the GCC member states. The congress
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will be attended by the following parties:
-- The Baghdad-banned Iraqi Communist Party.
-- The Bahrain National Liberation Front.
-- The Popular Front in Bahrain.
-- The Saudi Communist Party.
-- The Shiite National Democratic Forces in the Arabian Peninsula
and the Gulf.
-- Iran's Islamic Republican Party.
-- The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman.
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-- The North Yemen Communist Party.
— The Iranian Tudeh Party.
The chief objectives behind this planned Shiite-Marxist coalition
in the Gulf are to subvert all of the Gulf regimes and to preempt
Khomeini's internal opponents. Iran's Hojatollslam Hadi Modarressi
is alleged to be the mastermind of this coalition (he was also the
man reportedly behind the December 1981 Bahraini coup attempt).
I. OPINION
The earliest GCC communiques stressed that the Council was
founded on economic, social, informational, and educational coopera-
tion schemes. It has become increasingly apparent that the concern
for Gulf security was really the motivating factor in the minds of
the founding fathers and continues to be in the forefront of GCC
discussions. The GCC seems destined as the Middle East grouping
most likely to be responsible for the direction the Arab world takes
for the rest of this decade and perhaps into the next. Equipped
with the background on the Persian Gulf, Oman, and the GCC including
its friends and enemies, one is prepared to follow the events
occurring in one of the most volatile areas of the world.
Although the GCC seems to offer some viable solutions to Gulf
security problems, it is not the only grouping that should draw U.S.
support. The next chapter looks at another alternative direction
for U.S. support and that is toward increased involvement by the
Western Allies; specifically France and the United Kingdom.
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V. WESTERN ALLIED INVOLVEMENT IN GULF DEFENSE
Above and beyond the U.S. promotion of a regional defense
organization such as the GCC, a second alternative to increasing
the security of the Gulf is for the U.S. to emphasize that since
Western Europe and Japan have more at stake in the Gulf than the
U.S. (especially regarding oil), they should share a greater degree
of the burden of ensuring access to that oil. Increased allied
participation in Gulf security would decrease the U.S. role and
presence and could subsequently help to deemphasize the Gulf as
an area of Superpower confrontation. This chapter examines how
our Western allies could become involved in Gulf security.
A. JOINT ARMS SUPPLY
Brave statements by various Arab leaders that the Gulf states
can protect themselves are undoubtedly somewhat premature, but
they are important in reflecting a change of attitude and rejec-
tion of Superpower interference in the region. Anti-Western
rhetoric by Arab countires vis-a-vis U.S. arms for Omani basing by
and large has been aimed at the Superpowers, the U.S., and then the
West, in that order of precedence. Therefore, it seems that a U.S.
policy emphasizing the West as a whole would precipitate a less
vociferous Arab reaction.
The U.S. should not only encourage local initiatives toward
security arrangements and be prepared to assist the regional states
in achieving their common security goals, but should also persuade
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our allies to join in common efforts to develop both economic and
security ties with the GCC (if they choose to invite Western sup-
port). As has been mentioned many times since the oil crisis, the
U.S., as contrasted to NATO, is much less dependent on Gulf oil.
There is no convincing reason why the U.S. should try to go it alone
in forging ties with the GCC. But there are several reasons for
doing so in cooperation with other oil -consuming nations of the
West.
There are two reasons which immediately come to mind. Although
an American near monopoly of arms supply to the Gulf states would
help our balance of payments deficit (argueable in some circles),
the long term cost is too great. Our excessive military sales to
Iran became a major target of religious and political opposition
because they symbolized the military and political commitment of
the U.S. to the survival of an unpopular regime. A prudent future
arms sales policy would have a better chance of success if the Gulf
states understood that the U.S. and its allies were committed to
spreading the sale of military equipment among themselves. Such a
common Western arms policy might reduce the pressure on Washington
from the Gulf states for excessive amounts of American arms.
Another reason for a combined or joint Western approach is
that increased bilateral partnerships between the U.S. and indi-
vidual states would tend to entail even greater American omni-
presence in the Gulf region. Excessive presence of nationals from
any one nation would inevitably become unpalatable to indigenous
populations, not only as a perceived infringement on their political
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independence, but also an imagined affront to their cultural and
religious values. A more acceptable approach then is more Western
allies and less U.S.
European states may indeed cash in on their greater political
distance from Israel and can in specific cases cultivate their bi-
lateral relations with states in the region to enhance the vaunted
division of labor. Britain's contribution to Oman is one example.
Potentially, France's cultivation of Iraq, if pursued for alliance
rather than narrowly national interests, could be beneficial in
weakening the grip of the Soviet Union on that state. The historic
roles of Britain in the Gulf and France in Djibouti allow them a
presence that is less politically contentious than would be the
case of a "new" power. The European's reputation for discretion
could allow them to meet the lesser threats that these states may
face. Similarly, European states could provide assistance in in-
telligence, oil installation security, counter subversion, and riot
control techniques. In addition, by selling arms to the states
that require them not in a competitive but in a coordinated and in-
tegrated fashion, the European states could alleviate some of the
pressures on the U.S. and assure a more rational means of enhancing
Gulf security.
In the past the U.S. was seen as the guarantor of security and
the U.S. arms implied a commitment. They signalled to the region
its importance and reassured the recipient that a Superpower's
weight was behind it. Beginning with Camp David, relations between
the Arabs and the U.S. became increasingly disadvantageous.
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Recently, when the Israelis expelled the PLO from Beirut, the U.S.
was seen in the Arab world as an Israeli accomplice. The U.S. has
suffered by association with Israel in the Lebanese war, especially
in the eyes of traditionally friendly countries such as Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. The perception of American com-
plicity in Israel's invasion has fostered a feeling throughout the
Middle East that Washington is not keeping enough pressure on Israel
to ease its ever-tightening grip on the West Bank and Gaza. This
feeling tends to setback American interests and influence in the
region and has even added a greater stigma for an Arab country to
be identified with the U.S. In this context, the Europeans have
become more attractive. They are willing to sell arms without a
fuss, are probably more dependable in meeting smaller threats dis-
2
cretely, and are prepared to make the right noises about Palestine.
France and Britain in particular appear as attractive partners and
their individual potential contributions to Gulf defense is covered
next.
B. FRANCE
France is the only Western power, apart from the U.S., to have
an aircraft carrier capable of providing air superiority against
land-based air power as a deterrent or in the event that counter-
3intervention were needed. The French have the largest permanent
naval presence in the Indian Ocean, with four heavily-armed
frigates, and a command ship based at Djibouti, along with some
4,000 troops, plus about eight other support ships, destroyers,
and patrol ships in the region, most operating out of La Reunion
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island. Moreover, French naval and air force aircraft exercise
4
regularly out of Djibouti. Thus, while the U.S. struggles to
develop access to and a presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian
Ocean, the French already have one. French forces are not 2,300
miles away at Diego Garcia.
The question is, however, whether the French forces would be
committed to battle. Neither its allies nor its enemies can be
precisely sure of how they might be used in a crisis. Nonetheless,
their presence should be as reassuring to the West as they must be
unnerving to Moscow and the Aden Pact. The U.S. should suggest to
the French that they deploy a French aircraft carrier battle group
to the Arabian Sea at least once per year. This could immediately
enable a U.S. carrier battle group to either resume a Mediterranean
or Western Pacific patrol.
France reportedly has no plans to reduce its naval presence in
the Indian Ocean and sees it as valuable insurance for its interests
5
there. The U.S. should push for an even greater role for the French
by encouraging joint naval exercises not only with U.S. forces but
also with GCC naval forces (especially the Omani Navy). The Omani
Navy has evolved from a small police boat force to a modern coastal
patrol force equipped with state-of-the-art fast patrol craft.
With proper training and exposure to other navies, the Sultanate of
Oman's Navy could play a larger role in patrolling the Strait of
Hormuz and protecting that vital chokepoint.
The French naval contingent in the Indian Ocean also has several
amphibious units. Deployment of these amphibious units into the
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Gulf on a regular basis would relieve the burden placed on the U.S.
Amphibious Ready Groups, who also must be available for Western
Pacific contingencies. The French amphibious ships could also be
used to train a new force of indigenous Gulf troops which could be
molded into a Gulf rapid deployment force. Of course, some of the
foregoing ideas may sound somewhat idealistic; however, it is in the
best interest of the U.S. to promote this type of allied involvement
in Gulf defense. Not just the French but also the British have
several roles to play in the Gulf.
C. UNITED KINGDOM
Of all the European powers, none has a more ambivalent relation-
ship with the Middle East than the United Kingdom. This relationship
has varied from the seemingly altruistic and idealistic role of
T. E. Lawrence of Arabia, who, with the benign support of London,
gave some "dignity and unity" plus military know-how to the Arab
struggle against Ottoman oppression, to the cynical and self-interested
Sykes-Picot carving up of the Middle East with France. It also gave
the incredible bungling of the Palestine mandate, which has left the
Middle East a legacy of wars and strife to this day.
British military policy is now again paying more attention to the
Gulf and Southwest Asia. Three programs by which Britain can support
American efforts have been outlined.
"One is military training and assistance programs in Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Oman, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Bahrain. A second is the
occasional deployment of special air service units, warships and
combat aircraft throughout the area. Third, is the deployment of -,
two frigates with tankers and auxiliary craft to the Arabian Sea."
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Like the French navy, the Royal Navy should also become involved in
Gulf naval exercises and training of Gulf navies.
Despite U.S. involvement in Oman, British influence remains strong,
and with Omani (and U.S.) pressure may be persuaded to grow stronger.
Undoubtedly, Sultan Qabus would prefer to retain the British as his
big power supporter. He is reported to like neither the U.S. style
of doing things, nor the exposed position that an alliance with a
o
Superpower will put him in amongst his Arab and Iranian neighbors.
Sultan Qabus agreed to take part in the 1982 exercise Jade Tiger under
the condition that there would be no publicity. When the Washington
9
Post leaked the story, the Omanis were furious. It is this type of
lack of discretion on the part of the U.S. that causes Oman to favor
the more discrete relationships offered by the UK.
Based on historical precedent Britain's role in the Gulf should
be confined to Bahrain, the UAE, and Oman where its ties are the
closest. Britain's historical ties and rapport with the Gulf states,
which allowed the British government to play an important role in the
1978 constitutional crisis in the UAE, should not be allowed to fall
into disrepair. The U.S. should not be trying to upstage the
British but should instead work together with the British on a multi-
lateral British-Omani-U.S. plan for modernization of Oman's armed
forces.
A larger British contribution would be welcomed by the Sultanate
and other Gulf rulers because it would dilute the connection with
the U.S. Financial and manpower constraints rule out a permanent
British contribution to the Rapid Deployment Force but British naval
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task forces (most certainly including HMS INVINCIBLE) might step up
their visits to the Gulf area. In fact, in an early 1981 Washington
Press Conference, British Prime Minister Thatcher said that her
country and France could participate, with the U.S., in "the formation
of a permanent naval force which would reinforce security in the Gulf
region." She added that this could only be done with the approval
and the cooperation of the countries of the region. The U.S. could
take this a step farther and propose a multilateral naval force con-
sisting of GCC member state navies and Western allied navies. There
is an important constraint, however, which must be emphasized. Too
many expatriate advisors (U.S., British, and French especially) in
the Gulf can give the impression of Western control over national
affairs if the advisory role is allowed to become too conspicuous.
British presence in Oman serves to stabilize the domestic power
base of Sultan Qabus as well as provide requisite training and
assistance to his military forces. British interests in Oman like-
wise include military training objectives but obvious political
concerns for maintaining a Western influence in the regional balance
of power clearly transcend strict military goals. While the UK's
"show the flag" is limited by commitments elsewhere in NATO, con-
tinued British presence in Oman is the most likely course of action
for Her Majesty's Government. As such, the U.S. should foster an
increased British role in Oman thereby decreasing the U.S. role.
There seems to be general agreement in the West that there is a
need to build up a Western presence in the Persian Gulf region.
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What there has not been is discussion on exactly what the presence
should be or what parties should be involved. The West does not have
a particularly good record when it comes to overseas facilities in the
Middle East. In 1958 the Baghdad Pact was expelled from Baghdad with
the overthrow of the Iraqi Monarchy, in 1969 the U.S. was expelled
from a prime airbase when the Libyan Monarchy was overthrown, and in
1978 20,000 U.S. military advisors and technicians were expelled when
the Shah of Iran was overthrown.
A similar fate is likely to strike Oman or Somalia, which appear
to be the most promising hosts for U.S. bases or "occasional use"
facilities as they are politely called. Accordingly, if such U.S.
bases are to be established, they should also be expendable. Al-
ternatively, there might be a significantly lower probability of
expulsion of British forces than of American ones. The British
should be persuaded by the U.S. to regain bases which they previously
maintained in Kenya, Pakistan, or the sheikhdoms of the Gulf. For
example, there are several proposals being considered by Washington
and Islamabad including an upgrading of naval port facilities at
Karachi and a new naval facility at Gwadar on the far west coast of
Baluchistan, close to the Iranian border and less than 300 miles
across the Gulf of Oman from Muscat. London should be included in
these discussions. Moreover, it is time for a return of the British
east of the Suez in order to facilitate a multilateral Western
strategy for security in the Gulf.
Even if the U.S. should have to supply the major contribution to
such a strategy, it would still be important for other Western states
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to provide national contingents of their own, even if smaller in size
and composition, to demonstrate multilateral participation. In addi-
tion to the added symbolic strength of an integrated multilateral
strategy, further political measures could be taken which might
identify those other Western nations who do not contribute military
12
contingents to the enterprise. When specific cases arise where
Western support is needed to defend friendly local governments, it
would be far more useful for a multilateral declaration of support
to be issued even if action devolves on only one of them.
Alas, a multilateral Western strategy for Gulf security looks
good on paper but for it to become a reality is a dilemma. Without
a major improvement in Western Alliance harmony (one need only men-
tion the Soviet natural gas pipeline), which recognizes the need for
both restoring faith in its purposes and in redistributing roles within
it, the prospects for a collective allied response to the problems of
13
Gulf security are dim indeed. An increased role for France and the
United Kingdom will only come to pass if the U.S. realizes that it
cannot unilaterally protect Western interests in the Gulf. Communica-
tions amongst the Western allies must begin before the West loses
what little influence it has on the Arab side of the Gulf.
D. OTHER WESTERN ALLIES
While France and Great Britain could and should play larger roles
in Gulf security, several other Western allies could also share the
burden. Japan, which is most dependent on imported oil, spends very
little on defense, a fact which is becoming increasingly annoying to
some U.S. officials. Japan has a constitutional limitation on the
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size and deployment of its armed forces and it would be unreasonable
to expect Japan to become actively involved in Gulf security. Japan
could, however, take on added naval, antisubmarine, and air defense
roles in Asia that would relieve the pressure on U.S. forces. More-
over, Japan could become more vocal in its support of Western
initiatives in the Gulf region therefore showing more Western solidar-
ity (something that has been lacking of late).
Perhaps the Western ally which could be the greatest asset for
Gulf security is Turkey. Turkey's military power can indirectly
affect the balance of forces required in the region and the speed
and assurance with which power projection from the outside could take
place. According to a high-level Reagan administration source,
"Whereas some strategic planning in the Persian Gulf is a fantasy,
planning in Turkey is of the sort that makes for real deterrence of
15
Soviet military might."
Turkey is a critical strategic asset not only to the southern
flank of NATO but also to Western interests in the Gulf. Turkey,
like Oman, is being courted by the U.S. for base usage for the U.S.
RDF. What is significant though is that Turkey (more than Oman) is
susceptible to government instability and therefore could be an un-
reliable partner, if the U.S. were to base troops there or even
preposition supplies. Therefore, the U.S. should try to strengthen
and modernize the Turkish armed forces in order to maintain the
stability of Turkey. Turkey is an Alliance member, is democratic,
and needy. Turkey's stability will affect the range of choices
J
c
available to deal with Gulf contingencies. Albert Wohlstetter
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sums up Turkey's contribution to Persian Gulf security by saying,
"Perhaps most important of all, Turkish forces in Turkish facilities
can make a major contribution there."
A strong stable Turkey solves alot of potential problems. There
are opposing views, however, on the usefulness of Turkey. On the
one hand, a major U.S. RDF presence in Turkey is considered by some
to be the new "hole card" in the Persian Gulf and the key to the
1 g
effectiveness of the RDF. On the other hand, Turkey is considered
to be another liability with economic problems, a weak military, and
19
its own share of internal government weaknesses. Notwithstanding
its weaknesses, Turkey should continue to be cultivated by the U.S.
and be encouraged to join with other Western allies in defense of
their interests in the Gulf.
There are many corporate ventures where the senior partner has a
very low profile and is often not involved in all the corporation's
transactions. The U.S. should be the senior partner in the Western
Alliance and in this capacity maintain a very low profile while
allowing the other members to protect the interests of all. This
type of strategy will keep the Gulf from becoming the playing
field for a Superpower confrontation. The U.S., as senior partner,
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When the United States was negotiating for base rights in Oman,
it was operating under the perception that these bases were needed
to fill a "power vacuum" which resulted from the overthrow of the
Shah of Iran. Conventional wisdom held that the Soviet Union would
quickly make moves to alter the balance of power in the region.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan served quite well to help the
proliferation of a "Russians are coming" syndrome. The feeling of
the U.S. at the time was that the stationing of American troops in
the area would offset the Soviet advantage (thus the establishment
of the Rapid Deployment Force). The U.S. negotiating strategy, there-
fore, was to emphasize the Soviet threat and obtain a "strategic
consensus" for a regional security perimeter against Soviet expansionism,
which included the necessity for U.S. basing in the area.
In a region where independence, freedom from imperialism and
foreign domination, and self-sufficiency have been sold as primary
national virtues for many years, it is hard to justify the return of
Western power and influence. Iran has demonstrated that such tenets
may be taken too literally by the people and extended to include
freedom from royal, tribal, or dictatorial hereditary overlords as
well as from "foreign imperialists." The U.S. policy of trying to




The Omani facilities, that the U.S. is eager to obtain, are of
limited utility. The costs of using such facilities include not
only the direct payments in arms and economic aid requested by
Oman, but also the political price of siding with the Omani elite
in the various internecine conflicts in which the region is caught.
Coupled with the internal situation in Oman and its dependence on
outside Arab support, Oman is geographically desirable, but
politically unreliable as an ally.
In addition to the specific problems associated with basing in
Oman, Soviet reactions to U.S. attempts to bolster its naval and
land-based facilities in the Gulf region are sure to touch off an
arms race in the area. Rather than reestablishing U.S. influence,
a concentrated U.S. buildup may increase Soviet pressure via client
Arab radical states, the Horn of Africa, and in Afghanistan. With
the advent of Andropov to power in the USSR, now is not the time to
expand an American presence so close to the Soviet southern flanks.
During Andropov's consolidation of power period, the U.S. should
not push him into making any expansionist foreign policy decisions.
In formulating U.S. policy for the Gulf the Reagan Administra-
tion must put more emphasis on the problems and aspirations of the
region's peoples than on Soviet adventurism. A "limited U.S. in-
volvement" policy should be chosen that could be implemented with
velvet gloves rather than with an iron fist. This is the kind of
policy that the Gulf states would like to see applied to secure the
conservative regimes. They see the internal threat as basically
Islamic reformist, with some leftist backing, whereas the U.S.
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exaggerates all dissent in the area to Soviet-inspired, terrorist,
and Communist. The rulers fear that the failure of the U.S. to
appreciate the subtleties of regional politics will lead them to
committing blunders in the region comparable to those of Vietnam or
El Salvador, leaving the states the U.S. is protecting in a worse
state than before. Gulf rulers are aware of the now notorious U.S.
habit of backing "wrong horses" in countries where it wishes to
retain influence; Thieu in Vietnam, Lon Noi in Cambodia, Somoza in
Nicaragua, and the Shah in Iran. If the U.S. wants to keep Sultan
Qabus of Oman off this list, it must reverse its attempts for U.S.
basing and pursue an alternative policy for Gulf security.
Although increased Allied participation in Gulf security seems
to be a viable alternative, it too has its drawbacks. The West
Europeans have for a long time favored the stand-off approach to
Gulf security with military power over the horizon and visible
control in the hands of the Gulf rulers. The problem with their
support of this policy is that the over the horizon military power
consisted of the U.S. with very little, if any, Allied participation.
Europe, and especially Great Britain, has been made to feel too
guilty too long about its colonial past and it will take several
rounds of diplomatic urging by the U.S. to get the Europeans in-
volved again in Gulf affairs. One must also question the willing-
ness of the United Kingdom to deploy a naval contingent to the Gulf
region. After suffering major ship losses and spending close to three
billion dollars in their war against Argentina, the Royal Navy may not
be prepared to play a viable role in Gulf security.
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There are other disadvantages to reliance on the Western Allies
to Gulf security. One of these is the reliability of the commit-
ment. After all, France does not have a good record with its North
Atlantic partners and the non-consensus of opinion regarding USSR
economic sanctions portends other areas of disagreement. More sig-
nificant to the Gulf region, is the acceptability of increased
Allied involvement. The UK and France might make demands on Gulf
rulers for less autocratic rule and more democracy and this would
be an unacceptable price for the Gulf states to pay.
The alternative route for Gulf security which offers the most
promise is a combination of greater Allied participation and a
building up of Gulf Cooperation Council defenses. The Gulf De-
fense Ministers have conferred several times, since the founda-
tion of the GCC, and they have all agreed to up-grade, expand, and
coordinate their respective armed forces. The GCC has virtually
unlimited financial resources and the U.S. and Western Allies
should coordinate arms sales so that the GCC is put on the right
track toward improving its collective defenses. The problems of
standardization, procurement, and absorption of arms should be
coordinated among the U.S., its allies, and the GCC. A coordinated
Western arms transfer consortium should be established to control
the influx of arms and training to the GCC member states.
The removal of the stigma attached to an individual country's
identification with the West can be accomplished by this type of
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collective transfer arrangement. The arms, training, and support
would go directly to the GCC from the U.S. and its Allies. The
6CC would then coordinate further distribution among its members.
The present combined strength of the armed services of the six
Arab Gulf states of the GCC is in excess of 130,000, equipped with
over 1,000 medium tanks and 300 combat aircraft. With the use of
the Saudi Arabian AWACS aircraft and the development of a linked
air defense network, the GCC begins to take on the appearance of a
credible deterrent to Iranian (and Soviet client) expansion in the
region. Though unable to counter a Soviet move into the Gulf, the
defenses of the GCC could be reinforced by a multilateral supporting
force outside the region in Europe, Cyprus, or even Diego Garcia. A
multilateral naval presence in the Arabian Sea, western Indian Ocean,
and East African coastal waters, supported by low-profile harbor
facilities (in Somalia for example), could also assist the GCC if
the need arises.
The Carter Doctrine defined the Gulf as an area vital to
American interests. Therefore, there should be a U.S. policy
designed to protect these interests. The current policy of arms
for base rights in Oman was a "quick fix" policy initiated by a
past administration and served to make the administration look
good in the short run. This policy, however, could be inimical
in the long run for the U.S. and the world. A new U.S. policy is
needed for- the area. This thesis has offered alternative policies
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which neither force an overall strategic consensus on the Gulf
governments nor imply close military support arrangements. It




THE ARMED FORCES OF OMAN
Army 11 ,500.
2 Brigade HQ.
1 Royal Guard brigade.
3 artillery regiments.
1 signal regiment.





6 M60A1 , 12 Chieftain (on lease) medium tanks;
36 Saladin armd cars; 25 25-pdr, 36 105mm, 12 130mm guns;
12 155mm sp how; 81mm, 4, 2in, 120mm mor; TOW ATGW;
4 ZU-23-2 AA guns.
Navy 1,000
3 corvettes (1 Royal Yacht, 2 ex-Neth WILDERVANK).
2 Brooke Marine FAC(M) with 2 EXOCET SSM.
4 FAC(G).
1 log spt ship (amph).
5 LCU
(On order: 3 Province FAC(M) with EXOCET, 4 25-meter FAC(P),
3 SKIMA-12 hovercraft, 1 LCM).
Air Force 2,000; 38 combat aircraft.
1 FGA/ recce sqn with 12 HUNTER FGA-6, 4 T-7.
1 FGA sqn with 8 JAGUAR S(0) Mk 1 , 2 T-2.
1 GOIN/trg sqn with 12 BAC-167.
3 tpt sqns: 1 with 3 BAC-111, 1 FALCON 10; 2 with DEFENDER,
15 SKYVAN, 1 C-130H.
Royal fit with 1 GULFSTREAM, 1 VC-10 tpt, 2 AS-202 BRAVO trainers,
4 AB-212 hel.
1 hel sqn with 16 AB-205, 2 AB-206, 5 AB-214B.
2 AD sqns with 28 RAPIER SAM.
(on order: 12 JAGUAR FGA; 1 C-130H, 2 DHC-5D tpts;
28 BLINDFIRE radar; 250 SIDEWINDER AAM).
Para-military 3,300 tribal Home Guard (Firqats). Police
Marine Wing: 5 75-ft patrol boats; Air Wing: 1 LEARJET,
2 TURBO-PORTER, 2 MERLIN IVA, 2 BUFFALO ac, 5 AB-205,
3 AB-206 hel.
Order of Battle data obtained from:
The Military Balance 1981-82 , The International Institute for




THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL CONSTITUTION
The following is the text of the document signed on March 10, 1981
in Oman which established the Gulf Cooperation Council.
The Cooperation Council for the Arab State of the Gulf
Realizing that special realations, characteristics and similar
regimes link them; believing in the importance of establishing
close coordination in all spheres, especially the economic and
social ones; believing in common destiny and unity of objectives;
and desiring to realize coordination, integration and closer re-
lations in all spheres, the UAE, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, and
the State of Kuwait have decided to establish an organization that
will deepen and bring closer relations, ties and cooperation among
its members in various spheres.
The organization shall be called the Cooperation Council for
the Arab States of the Gulf. Its headquarters will be in Riyadh,
Saudia Arabia. It will be the means for realizing coordination,
integration, and closer relations. It will also draw up regulations
covering the economy, finance, education, culture, social affairs,
health, communications, information, passports and nationality,




The Council will comprise: a) the Supreme Council to which
shall be attached the body for resolving disputes; b) the Ministerial
Council; c) the Secretariat General.
THE SUPREME COUNCIL will comprise the heads of member states and
the Presidency will rotate in alphabetical order. The Council will
meet in normal sessions twice a year. Each member has the right to
call for an emergency meeting which may take place if seconded by
another member. The Supreme Council will draw up the overall policy
of the Cooperation Council and the basic lines it will follow. It
will discuss recommendations, laws and byelaws presented it by the
Ministerial Council and the Secretariat General in preparation for
their endorsements. It will also form the body for resolving of
disputes.
BODY FOR RESOLVING OF DISPUTES will be attached to the Supreme
Council and will resolve existing disputes or any that may take
place between member states. It will also be the reference point
for the interpretation of the basic byelaws of the Cooperation
Council
.
THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL will be formed from Foreign Ministers
of member states, or any ministers deputising for them and will
draw up the basic regulations for the Secretariat General. It
will prepare for meetings of the Supreme Council discussing studies,
topics, recommendations, byelaws and laws and will draw up the
agendas for the meetings of the Cooperation Council. It will meet
six times a year (once e^ery two months) and emergency sessions may
be held if proposed by two member states.
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It will draw up policies, recommendations, studies and projects
aimed at developing cooperation and coordination among member states
in various spheres and will encourage aspects of cooperation and
coordination between the various activities of the private sector.
It will work to encourage, develop and coordinate the existing
activities between member states in various spheres. Such activities
shall be binding should the Ministerial Council endorse them. It
will recommend competent ministers to draw up policies as well as
studies.
THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL will be appointed by the Supreme Council
which will define the conditions and period of office of the
Secretary General who will be a subject of one of the member states.
The Secretary General will be responsible directly for all the work
of Assistant Secretaries General, the Secretariat General and the
correct course of work in the various departments.
The Secretariat General shall have data information apparatus
and will prepare studies concerning cooperation and coordination.
It will follow up implementation of the resolutions and recommenda-
tions of the Supreme Council and the Ministerial Council by member
states; prepare reports and studies required by the Ministerial
Council; prepare budgets and final accounts and prepare the draft
of financial and administrative byel.aws that will make the body
commensurate with the growth of the Cooperation Council and its in-
creasing responsibilities. The Secretariat General shall have a





THE PROVISIONS OF THE ADEN PACT
The contents of the treaty between the three radical states have
not been formally released; however, various sources of information
have allowed the main provisions to be pieced together.
- Sign a mutual defense pact to ensure military and security
coordination between the three states.
- Establish a Defense Council of the Defense Ministers of each
state.
- Establish military sub-committees which will be attached to the
Higher Council of Heads of State.
- The exchange of material assistance between the three state.
- The exchange of help to each state to help it meet the provisions
of its planned development programs.
- The promotion of trade between the three countries.
- The coordination of trilateral economic policies at international
and regional meetings of relevant organizations.
- Struggle against the Camp David agreements.
- Provide active support for liberation movements, especially those
in Namibia, South Africa, the Sahara, Somalia (under the leader-
ship of the National Salvation Front), North Yemen (under the
leadership of the National Democratic Front), Oman (under the
leadership of the PFLO), Sudan and Egypt (under the leadership
of "progressive movements").
- Oppose the establishment of American bases in the Horn of Africa,
the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa.
- Oppose the "reactionary security, military, and political blocs
in the African and Arab regions.
- Reject the presence of foreign fleets in the Indian Ocean, the
Red Sea, and the Mediterranean.
- Present a coordinated stand at international conferences.
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South Yemen and Ethiopia unconditionally support the Libyan
stand on Chad.
Take steps to deepen alliances with progressive statesin the
region and with the socialist bloc.
Support the Palestinian cause and the right of the Palestinian
people to establish an independent state on its national soil.
Form a political committee comprising the Foreign Ministers of
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